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The massive scal stimulus measures we have seen in the recent years have brought ques-
tions about the eectiveness of certain government actions back to the fore. My focus here
is on the dynamic eects of changes in government spending, taxes and the distribution
between prots and labor income. The econometric procedures explicitly take into account
structural breaks, regime-dependency and time-varying parameters.
The rst chapter addresses the question of functional income redistribution for the
postwar economies of the U.S. and Canada within a structural VECM with up to two
breaks of unknown timing. Cointegrating rank and break dates are estimated jointly. In
the U.S. the short-run spending eect on output, set in motion by higher labor income,
is strong enough to make such a redistribution an attractive, maybe provocative, policy
alternative. Across the border in Canada, however, the negative medium-run capacity
eect, brought about by diminished prots, dominates the picture more or less from the
beginning and output slumps considerably. The result actually suggests a, maybe even
more provocative, redistribution toward prots. I discuss several possible explanations
like the formation of expectations and the dierent exposure to international trade.
In the second chapter I provide a novel way to assess the impact of a government
spending stimulus on U.S. activity. The novelty lies in the combination of 
exible projec-
tions and regime switches between recessions and expansions. This combined approach has
numerous advantages: it captures asymmetries over the business cycle; it can approximate
other important smooth nonlinearities in the DGP; it is more robust to misspecication;
and estimation can be simply done by least squares. I nd a stimulus to be considerably
more eective in recessions with a prolonged period of high spending, steadily increasing
output, surging federal debts, and a well working multiplier eect which, over time, drives
debt levels back to trend. During expansions, or in a symmetric model without regime
switches, there is only a short lived positive eect on output, too short for the multiplier
to kick in. Constraint in its capacity to increase taxes the government systematically cuts
spending below trend to control the level of federal debts.
The last chapter studies the dynamic eects of changes in government spending or




taxes by means of a time-varying parameter structural VAR. The smooth and gradual
changes of the parameters in the VAR make this model the perfect choice to study the
evolution of the eectiveness of scal policy, as opposed to the dierent eects in recessions
and expansions. My results accord well with the notion of important changes in the
transmission of scal policy in the U.S.: the eectiveness in stabilizing the economy has
decreased, more or less so for tax shocks and de facto with respect to spending. I also nd
evidence, through counterfactual policy simulations, for positive long-run eects on output
when the government actively reduces the level of debts by cutting spending. A passive
debt reduction in the form of faster tax adjustments in response to past expenditures has
adverse eects on output.




An Empirical Characterization of Redistribution
Shocks and Output Dynamics
(joint with Robert Stehrer)
What are the economic eects of redistributing one dollar from prots to la-
bor income? We address this question for the post-World War II economies
of the United States and Canada within a structural VECM procedure al-
lowing for up to two breaks of unknown timing. In the United States the
short-run spending eect on growth, set in motion by higher labor income,
is strong enough to make such a redistribution an attractive, maybe provoca-
tive, policy alternative. Across the border in Canada, however, the negative
medium-run capacity eect, brought about by diminished prots, dominates
the picture more or less from the beginning and output slumps considerably.
The result actually suggests a, maybe even more provocative, redistribution
toward prots. We discuss several possible explanations like the formation
of expectations and the dierent exposure to international trade. Method-
ologically, we provide a novel procedure to estimate cointegrating rank and
break dates jointly. (JEL C32, C53, E12, E25)
Keywords: labor income/prot redistribution; structural VECM; joint esti-
mation of cointegrating rank and multiple break dates
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1.1 Introduction
In the last two decades numerous authors and research groups have put in huge eorts
and ingenuity to correctly disentangle and characterize the economic eects of shocks to
technology and monetary policy. Issues on the economic eects of a \redistribution shock"
or, say, transferring money between labor income and prots, although having a long
tradition in macroeconomics, fell into disfavor in the main economic debate.1 In light of
the 2009 economic crisis and discussion on potential economic stimulus programs other
than government spending and low interest rate policies, we address the question on how
such a redistribution shock will aect output.
From a theoretical perspective the debate might be characterized by focusing on two
channels which aect aggregate demand: a short-run spending eect on the one and a
medium-run capacity eect on the other hand. The spending argument rests on the post-
Keynesian perspective of diering marginal propensities to spend out of labor income
and prots.2 Workers will spend more of an additional dollar than rms and, therefore, a
redistribution toward labor income will increase output. The capacity argument positively
links investment with realized and expected prots. As a consequence, a distributional
shift toward prots (equivalently, away from labor income) might have a positive eect on
investment, resulting in higher output growth over the medium-run.3
In view of the trade-o between these two channels, our purpose in this paper is to
characterize the dynamic eects of a redistribution between labor income and prots on
output in the United States and Canada during the post-World War II period. We do so
using a small 3-dimensional structural vector time series model of quarterly labor income,
prots and output. Identifying a redistribution shock is intricate, inasmuch as any output
eect generated by the redistribution has, in turn, an immediate eect back on prots
and labor income. Prots may move with output under existing markup rates, and labor
income changes as rms and workers try to adjust employment and wage rates. But exactly
1 See European Commission (2007, Chap. 5) for a recent overview of the debate.
2 Though not going into detail, a view linked to economists related to the Keynesian and post-
Keynesian tradition such as John Maynard Keynes himself, Richard Goodwin, Nicholas Kaldor,
Michael Kalecki and Joan Robinson to name a few.
3 From a more general perspective, this debate centers around the notion of wage-led versus
prot-led economic expansion; see Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) for a model which can accommodate
both views and Stockhammer, Onaran and Ederer (2009) for an empirical application thereof.
Hauzenberger, Klemens (2011), On the Dynamic Effects of Government Stimulus: Measures in a Changing Economy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/27895CHAPTER 1 3
these \automatic" responses of labor income and prots render the identication problem
to be non-recursive and standard procedures such as a simple Choleski decomposition
are not applicable. Therefore, to achieve identication, we opt for a structural VECM
approach and exploit its inherent long-run restrictions to obtain estimates of the automatic
responses, and, by implication, identication of temporary and permanent shocks. The
distinction between the types of shocks and our clear focus on redistribution as a possible
aggregate demand instrument lead us to design a redistribution shock as a combination
of transitory shocks to labor income and prots. We design it such that there is a one-
for-one redistribution between labor income and prots. Having dened and identied the
redistribution shock we can trace its dynamic eects on output. This is, in a nutshell,
what we aim at in this paper.
Structural vector time series approaches, in general, have been widely used to assess
the eects of technology shocks, monetary policy, and scal policy (see, in particular, King
et al. 1991, Bernanke and Mihov 1998, Blanchard and Perotti 2002). We argue that such
an approach is equally well suited to study the eects of a redistribution between labor
income and prots for two reasons. First, movements in labor income and prots can
be treated as exogenous with respect to output because stabilization motives, in contrast
to monetary policy, are rarely the predominant driving force behind 
uctuations in the
distribution. A redistribution shock is therefore exogenous with respect to output. Second,
and similar to scal policy, decision and implementation lags rule out|at least within a
quarter|most of the discretionary response of labor income and prots to unexpected
contemporaneous changes in output. What is left then are the automatic responses of
unexpected movements in output on labor income and prots for which we account for in
our identication strategy to obtain a proper representation of a redistribution shock.
The long time span of the post-World War II period contains, most probably, struc-
tural breaks. We therefore allow for up to two level breaks of unknown timing in our
structural VECM. We do so by combining an \older" approach on how to estimate the
break dates with recent advances in testing for the cointegrating rank when breaks are
present. The older approach goes back to the unit root test of Zivot and Andrews (1992)
and its numerous successors. The goal is to pick the two break dates such that most
weight is given to the stationary alternative. Gregory and Hansen (1996) extend these
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unit root tests to residual-based cointegration analysis in which the weight is then al-
ways on the alternative hypothesis of the next higher cointegrating rank. We take up
this testing strategy but perform the cointegration tests with two level breaks within the
framework of Saikkonen and L utkepohl (2000a, 2000b), and L utkepohl, Saikkonen and
Trenkler (2004). This yields a two-step system-based framework. In the rst step one
removes the deterministic components by a feasible generalized least squares procedure.
Then, in the second step, we apply the commonly used Johansen (1995) likelihood ratio
test to the adjusted series. The prior adjustment is convenient because it results in an
asymptotic null distribution of the cointegration rank test statistic which does not depend
on the timing of the level breaks.
Besides the empirical question addressed and the issues related to identication, the
\joint nature" of our estimation of the cointegrating rank and the two break dates, is
the methodological contribution of this paper. Other approaches typically estimate the
break dates before the cointegration analysis, either on the basis of an|with respect to
the cointegrating rank|unrestricted model (see, e.g., L utkepohl, Saikkonen and Trenkler
2004, Saikkonen, L utkepohl and Trenkler 2006) or on the basis of unit root tests (see, e.g.,
Koukouritakis and Michelis 2009) Our joint estimation procedure removes an additional
layer of uncertainty from the analysis, as it avoids the pre-test bias introduced by using
dierent models for choosing cointegrating rank and break dates. The paper also provides
Monte Carlo evidence showing the basic consistency of our joint estimation procedure.
Our main results underline the trade-o between the two transmission channels men-
tioned above. In the United States the short-run spending eect is strong enough to make
a one-dollar redistribution from prots toward labor income successful in terms of output
growth: output is above trend for two years, with a multiplier of 0.51 dollars, before the
negative capacity eect eventually takes over. In Canada, however, this negative capacity
eect dominates the picture more or less from the beginning. After initially increasing by
0.47 dollars, output slumps by notable 1.73 dollars within the rst two years and reverts
to trend only slowly thereafter. Thus, it is a redistribution toward labor income that has a
positive short-run eect on output in the United States, whereas in Canada one will need
to shift sources in the opposite direction to generate a positive eect. We discuss several
issues in turn why the transmission of a redistribution shock diers in the two countries.
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Prominent candidates among them are dierences in the formation of expectations, per-
haps explained by the growing gap in unionization and collective bargaining power, and
dierences in the exposure to international trade.
1.2 Identication and Theoretical Background
Throughout the paper we will use a small 3-dimensional VECM with two level breaks
including labor income, prots and output for the United States and Canada. The identi-
cation of more, possibly non-zero, contemporaneous relations|including the automatic
responses|than the k(k + 1)=2 distinct elements of the covariance matrix actually oer
in a k-dimensional system is at the center of our methodology. Accordingly, we want to
impose less than k(k   1)=2 restrictions on the contemporaneous relations. The parsimo-
nious setup of the model ignores potentially important macroeconomic variables hiding
a detailed analysis of the transmission channel, e.g. through consumption or investment.
Higher dimensional systems with possible cross-country linkages would require a dierent
framework to study the eects of a redistribution in more detail. An option, for instance,
could be the global error-correcting model of Pesaran, Schuermann and Weiner (2004) or
the global VAR of Dees et al. (2007). Because of diculties with identication, cointe-
gration and breaks we stick to our small three variable model, which shall be sucient to
characterize the most relevant features of redistributing between labor income and prots.
Our strategy to achieve identication makes use of the endeavors of John Hicks and
Paul Samuelson to absorb Keynes thoughts into neoclassical economics. The result, as
Blanchard (1997) forcefully argues, is the core of usable macroeconomics. Two propositions
build the basis for what we nowadays know as the neoclassical synthesis: rst, in the
short-run aggregate demand dominates movements in economic activity and, second, the
economy tends to return to a steady-state growth path. A redistribution shock changes
aggregate demand and, therefore, these two propositions characterize the long-run eects
of such a shock, after all the complex short- and medium-run eects have worked out.
Essentially, this characterization suggests a stable steady-state relation of labor income
and prots with output, giving the notion of two cointegration relations in the data.
Cointegration puts restrictions on the permanent impact matrix, thus reducing the number
of restrictions we need to impose on the contemporaneous relations. From a methodological
Hauzenberger, Klemens (2011), On the Dynamic Effects of Government Stimulus: Measures in a Changing Economy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/27895CHAPTER 1 6
point of view this type of identication follows the VECM approach of King et al. (1991).
Suppose the observed sample is fytgT
t=1 in which yt is a 3-dimensional vector con-
taining the logarithm of quarterly real macroeconomic time series on labor income (inct),
prots (t), and output (gdpt). Without loss of generality we can write a structural
model linking the reduced-form residuals futgT
t=1 of the vector time series model with the
mutually uncorrelated structural shocks fetgT


















































or more compactly as ut = Bet. Once we embed the structural model in a VECM with the
two suggested cointegration relations the rst two structural shocks will have transitory
eects only. We interpret these shocks as labor income and prot shocks. The permanent
shock, e
gdp
t , may be interpreted as a productivity or growth shock, but since that is
not at issue, there is no point in exploring the permanent shock further. Admittedly,
interpreting residuals in small dimensional systems as structural shocks is always perilous,
and our interpretation of the two temporary shocks as labor income and prot shocks is
no exception.
The structural model allows to formally dene a linear combination of the two tran-
sitory shocks such that there is a one-for-one redistribution between labor income and
prots.
DEFINITION 1.1: (Redistribution shock) e
s = (1;";0)0 with " =  (b11+b21)=(b12+b22)
such that uinc
s =  u
s at time s when the shock occurs.
The last equation of our structural model contains the eects of a redistribution shock
on output, captured by b31einc
t and "b32e
t , in which the parameters b31 and b32 are the
ones absorbing the marginal propensities to spend out of labor income and prots. These
two parameters principally re
ect two dierent channels through which the shock aects
output within the quarter: the direct impact eect after all immediate feedback eects have
unfolded, and any discretionary adjustment made to rules and laws that in
uence wage
setting, employment, and prot opportunities. We follow the approach by Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) in their study on the eects of scal policy and rule out the second channel
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because of decision and implementation lags. It usually takes policymakers more than
a quarter to analyze, decide, and implement measures, if any, to respond to unexpected
events.
Any eect on output through b31 and b32 may have an immediate eect back on prots
and labor income. For any change in output, prots move under existing markup rates, and
rms and workers try to adjust employment and wage rates accordingly. The parameters
b13 and b23 implicitly take up these \automatic" responses though only implicitly as our
structural model formulates relations for the shocks rather than the observable variables.
The parameters, therefore, do not have an interpretation as automatic responses. This
statement will become clear momentarily in Remark 1.1. In the same way, b31 and b32 are
not marginal propensities but are the direct impact eects.
REMARK 1.1: The structural model in (1.1) nests all models which explicitly formulate
relations between the observable variables and the shocks.4 One simple, yet general, way




















in which the parameters c1 and c2 can be interpreted as marginal propensities to spend,
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This simple model already shows how complex the underlying structure of the model in
(1.1) may be. By estimating directly the B-model we avoid imposing any specic structure
on the relations between the observable variables and the shocks. Nevertheless, the model
4 See Amisano and Giannini (1997) and L utkepohl (2005) for the dierent ways to set up a
structural vector time series model.
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here is suggestive for one important reason: if we do not allow b13 and b23 to dier from
zero in (1.1), all automatic response eects would disappear from the analysis.
Let us now describe the procedure how to just-identify our structural model. Proposi-
tion 6.1 in L utkepohl (2005) shows that in a VECM yt can be decomposed in the Beveridge-








jBet j + y0: (1.3)
y0 are the starting values of the process;
P1
j=0 
j is an innite-order polynomial that
contains only transitory eects with 
j converging to zero as j ! 1; and the common
trends term B
Pt
i=1 ei captures the permanent eects of shocks.  has rank k   r and















in which ? and ? are orthogonal complements of  and  such that 0? = 0 and
0? = 0.
We get the restricted maximum likelihood estimator of B by maximizing the concen-
trated log-likelihood function (omitting the constant),











subject to the structural short- and long-run constraints,
Csrvec(B) = csr and Clrvec(B) = clr; (1.6)
with the usual denitions for tr() and vec(): tr() denotes the trace of a matrix and the
vec-operator transforms a matrix into a vector by stacking the columns. Using the rules
of the vec-operator and a proper selection matrix CB we can reformulate the long-run
constraint, Clr, as CB(Ik 
 ), in which the operator 
 denotes the Kronecker product.
The reformulation of the long-run constraint reveals its stochastic nature: Clr includes
the estimator for  from (1.4). Finally, Csr species short-run constraints by restricting
elements of B directly, and u is the estimated covariance matrix from a reduced-form
VECM specied later. We deliberately express the constraints in (1.6) in linear form in
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order to make the scoring algorithm of Amisano and Giannini (1997) applicable. The
Amisano-Giannini scoring algorithm is numerically simpler and faster than maximizing
(1.5) subject to nonlinear constraints. The scoring algorithm yields an asymptotically
ecient and normally distributed maximum likelihood estimator of B (see, e.g., L utkepohl
2005, Chap. 9.3.2).
The permanent eects of the structural shocks are given by the matrix B. As already
noted, in a VECM some of the structural shocks have transitory eects only, depending
on the cointegrating rank r. We can then restrict r columns in B to zero. To be more
specic, because the matrix B has reduced rank k r, each column of zeros stands for k r
independent restrictions. As such, the r transitory shocks represent r(k   r) independent
restrictions only. In total we then have k(k 1)=2 r(k r) missing restrictions which can
be placed on B and B based on other statistical or theoretical considerations. From the
statistical side, we get some guidance on how many restrictions we need to place on the
contemporaneous impact matrix B. Because each of the r transitory shocks corresponds
to a zero column in B, there is no way to disentangle the transitory shocks with further
long-run restrictions. The guideline is then to impose r(r 1)=2 restrictions on B directly
(see, e.g., L utkepohl 2005, Chap. 9.2).
Applied to our 3-dimensional model these considerations imply the following strategy
to get the three required restrictions. With the emphasized two cointegration relations we
have two transitory shocks and one permanent shock. From that structure of the model
we get two independent restrictions from the long-run properties. So there is one more
restriction left which has to be imposed on the contemporaneous impact matrix B in order
to disentangle the two transitory shocks. Our set of feasible options contains b12 = 0 or
b21 = 0. The restriction b12 = 0 is theoretically more appealing: higher prots do not
translate into additional labor income contemporaneously, while prots may react swiftly
to labor income shocks. Implicitly we assume some rigidities on the labor market here.
1.3 Estimation Procedures
1.3.1 Data Description
Our data sources are the NIPA and CANSIM tables from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis and Statistics Canada. The set of data includes the logarithm of real labor
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income, corporate prots and output.5 Specically, we are using quarterly data from
1947:1 to 2008:4 for the United States and 1961:1 to 2008:4 for Canada. These are the
longest possible time spans available for these two countries.
Labor income is the total compensation accruing to employees as remuneration for
their work; it is the sum of wage and salary accruals and of supplements to wages and
salaries before taxes. There are no transfer payments included. Corporate prots, or
prots for short, are the current production incomes before taxes of organizations required
to le corporate tax returns. With several dierences prots simply consist of receipts less
expenses as dened in the tax law. In particular, one such dierence in both countries is
the exclusion of capital gains and dividends received. Consequently, our two measures of
labor income and prots do not add up to output. Multicollinearity is therefore not an
issue.
Figure 1.1 plots the trend and cyclical characteristics of the data. All six series display
a strong upward trend with prots being quite volatile, while the labor income and prot
shares seem to be|with a few qualications|relatively stable over the time.
In the United States labor income rose faster than productivity in the years after
World War II and the labor income share increased steadily from 52 to 56 percent by
the early 1960s. Later on in the 1960s President Johnson's Great Society social reforms
mark the sharp increase in the labor income share to about 59 per cent. From then on
the labor income share stays at this high level through the stag
ation years of the 1970s.
Strong output growth after the twin recession of the early 1980s led the labor income
share to adjust downwards to a new level of 57 percent. Only at the end of the 1990s
the labor income share surges again, mainly in
uenced by the general economic success
of that decade. This development was, however, only short lived and came to a halt with
the economic turbulence of the 2000s. Although naturally linked, the steady fall in the
prot share in the United States by the mid-1980s had mostly other causes: American
geopolitical power and thus the ability of the government to manipulate terms of trade
in the interests of its large rms eroded over time; the rise in labor militancy brought on
5 United States (http://www.bea.gov/National/ retrieved on May 16, 2009): labor income
(1.12, line 2), corporate prots (1.12, line 13), output (1.1.5, line 1), and the de
ator (1.1.4, line 1).
Canada (http://cansim2.statcan.gc.ca/ retrieved on July 22, 2009): labor income (380-0001, item
2), corporate prots (380-0001, item 3), output (380-0001, item 1), and the de
ator (380-0003,
item 1).
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Figure 1.1: The Time Series with Labor Income-Output and Prot-Output Shares
Notes: Top panels: the order of the time series is output, labor income and prots; all variables
are in logarithms and in real terms; to facilitate better graphing we add constants to these
variables.
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by low unemployment after 1964; and the intensication of competition in the 1960s|
re
ected both in the erosion of oligopoly pricing power within domestic industries and
in increased trade competition from rivals such as Japan and Germany. Then, from the
late 1980s onwards labor productivity rose faster than real wages, explaining the bouncing
back of the prot share.
On the other side of the border a period known as the Great Canadian Slump domi-
nates the picture. High interest rates, set to bring down in
ation to a new target below two
percent, played a key role in this deep economic and scal crisis of 1990-96 (Fortin 1996,
1999). Moreover, the real wage and employment adjusted such that the labor income
share fell persistently back from about 54 percent to its pre-1967 level of 51 percent while
the prot share recovered quickly and kept increasing thereafter. Since those turbulent
years in the rst half of the 1990s the Canadian economy has improved noticeably, in step
with the neighbor's boom years. Moreover, Canada has become a role model of scal
stability as the government has posted surpluses every scal year since 1996. Besides the
Great Slump the Canadian time series experienced relatively large swings in the shares
in the 1970s and early 1980s. During the 1973 oil crisis prots were soaring in oil rich
Alberta, before the sharp negative eect of the global oil embargo on the industrial east,
which suered many of the same problems of the United States, swept away the eect of
the boom in the west on nationwide prots. Then, from October 1975 to October 1978,
the Canadian government installed wage and price controls in order to reduce the rate of
in
ation while, at the same time, suppressing the Phillips curve eect on unemployment
that typically accompanies an anti-in
ation policy. The program generally targeted wages
by specic numerical guidelines and prices were controlled indirectly through control of
prot margins. With these wage and price controls the Canadians followed the United
States, which had a similar program in place already a few years early, but building on the
experience of its neighbor the Canadians were able to establish a more successful program
(see Barber and McCallum 1982, Chap. 2). On top of that, Canada was hard hit by the
recession of the early 1980s, with interest rates, unemployment, and in
ation all being
higher than in the United States.
Taken together, the visual inspection of the data veries our hunch that output forms
a stationary linear combination with both labor income and prots, at least when properly
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accounting for possible breaks in the comovement of the data. Our informal discussion of
some historical facts in the United States and Canada will be a useful guide in the next
section where the aim is to formally estimate and justify the timing of the breaks. The
discussion of the historical events based on the shares is appealing, and without loss of
generality in terms of the exact cointegration properties, since what matters are the breaks
that show up in the comovements and may therefore disguise the \true" cointegrating rank.
1.3.2 Assumptions and Framework of the Reduced-Form Analysis
Following our empirical strategy we have to estimate the cointegration rank and the
break dates. With respect to the latter we extend the setup of L utkepohl, Saikkonen and
Trenkler (2004) to allow for two level breaks of unknown timing. A structural break, or
break for short, in our context is a rare event that disguises the otherwise stable stochas-
tic comovements in the data, such as cointegrating relations. Ignoring a break may result
in a misleading estimate of the cointegrating rank and the equilibrium relations through
distorted size and power properties of conventional cointegration tests. Conversely, over-
estimating the number of structural breaks has the same negative side eects on rank and
equilibrium relations.
We incorporate breaks into our analysis under the assumption that the k-dimensional
vector of observable variables, fytgT
t=1, is at most integrated of order one and has cointe-
grating rank r with a maximum of two structural breaks. Specically, the vector process
evolves according to
yt = 0 + 1t + 1d1t + 2d2t + xt; (1.7)
in which 0, 1, 1, and 2 are unknown k  1 parameter vectors; dit = 1 for t  Ti,
i = 1;2, and zero otherwise with Ti denoting the time period when a structural break
occurs; and xt is an unobservable stochastic process which we assume to have a VAR(p)
representation,
xt = A1xt 1 +  + Apxt p + ut: (1.8)
The Aj's are the usual kk parameter matrices and ut = (u1;:::;uk)0 are the reduced-form
residuals which are i.i.d. vectors with zero mean. This setup of the model can capture
the dynamic interactions between the variables and their other properties discussed in
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Figure 1.1, such as the trending behavior and possible breaks. We therefore consider our
model as a proper representation of the underlying data generating process.
The VECM(p   1) form of xt is
xt = xt 1 +  1xt 1 +  +  p 1xt p+1 + ut; (1.9)
in which  is the dierence operator such that xt = xt   xt 1, and with the obvious
mapping  =  (Ik  A1  Ap) and  j =  (Aj+1++Ap) for j = 1;:::;p 1. The
kk matrix  is of reduced rank, that is  = 0 in which both  and  are kr matrices
of full column rank. We further dene 	 = Ik    1   :::    p 1 = Ik +
Pp 1
j=1 jAj+1.
We can then write the data generating process (1.7) in VECM form, and in terms of
observable variables only, as
yt =  + 
 










2jd2t j) + ut; (1.10)
in which dit j are impulse dummies with value one in period t = Ti+j and zero elsewhere.
The mapping with the parameters in (1.7) and (1.9) is now a bit cumbersome: for i = 1;2
and j = 1;:::;p   1 we have  =  0 + 	1, 01 = 0, 1 6= 0, i = 0i, 
i0 = i,
and 
ij =   ji. Appendix Appendix 1.1 contains the level VAR version of the VECM
without the rank restrictions on .
Apparently, we have sneaked in a few non-trivial assumptions along the way which
we now state and discuss more explicitly.
ASSUMPTION 1.1: At most two structural breaks have occurred in the vector of observ-
able variables, fytgT
t=1.
Admittedly the limit of two structural breaks is arbitrary and mostly determined by
computational tractability. We believe, however, that our choice is appropriate and a good
compromise to accommodate a suciently large number of breaks helping us to uncover
the \true" cointegrating rank of . If someone wants to estimate a higher number of
structural breaks, the paper of Qu and Perron (2007) is a good point of departure. Based
on the Bellman principle it oers a quite fast search algorithm over a prespecied maximum
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number of breaks. Although the Bellman principle provides a beautiful way to reduce the
computational burden, it comes at a cost. In some preliminary research, we nd that the
Qu-Perron search algorithm is extremely sensitive to the choice of the minimum regime
length and the allowed maximum number of breaks.
ASSUMPTION 1.2: A structural break is a shift in the level of fytgT
t=1. Furthermore,
01 = 0 and 1 6= 0.
In other words, we purge all linear trends from the analysis. In line with the theoretical
considerations about the tendency of the economy to return to a steady-state growth
path, the equilibrium relations between labor income, prots and output cannot linearly
drift apart. Our setup of the data generating process (1.7) with two breaks is, however,

exible enough to allow the equilibrium relations to drift apart over some extended period.
In the United States, for instance, the 1950s and 1960s may represent such a period
(see Figure 1.1). While we could capture this period with a broken linear trend in the
equilibrium relations we choose to model it as an adjustment in the levels. A broken linear
trend would \throw away" at least some information in the data (see, e.g., Enders 2009).
We will back up our argument here in the next sections.
We pay little attention to the linear trend in the data generating process (1.7) because
it is the stochastic part which we are ultimately interested in. Generally, a unit root with
drift approximates a trending variable well enough in a vector time series model (see again
Enders 2009). The linear trend in (1.7) is then implicitly generated by the intercept in
(1.10) and the non-stationary behavior of the individual variables (see the unit root tests
in Table 1.2). As such, the matrix  in (1.9) must be of reduced rank, r < k. With full
rank, r = k, the whole system would be stable and, in such a system, an intercept cannot
generate the upward trend apparent in the series.
To bring our framework to life we need to develop procedures to estimate the coin-
tegrating rank, r, and the timing of the two structural breaks, T1 and T2. Furthermore,
we somehow have to accommodate the \at most two structural breaks" statement of As-
sumption 1.1, in order to asses the statistical signicance of the breaks. These issues will
be our main tasks in the remainder of this section.
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1.3.3 Joint Estimation of Cointegrating Rank and Break Dates
Our joint estimation procedure combines the way how Gregory and Hansen (1996)
determine the timing of a break with the procedure of Saikkonen and L utkepohl (2000a,
2000b) for testing the cointegrating rank of a vector process. The rst ingredient, the
Gregory-Hansen test, can be thought as the multivariate extension of unit root tests in the
tradition of Zivot and Andrews (1992). These tests pick a break date such that the most
weight is on the (trend) stationary alternative. The idea behind the second ingredient,
the Saikkonen-L utkepohl test, is to estimate the deterministic terms in (1.7) rst and, in
a second step, to apply a likelihood ratio (LR) type test, as in Johansen (1995), to the
adjusted series. The prior adjustment for deterministic terms oers one crucial advantage:
multiple breaks in the level leave the limiting distribution of the LR-statistic unaected.
Theorem 4.1 in L utkepohl, Saikkonen and Trenkler (2004) and the remarks thereafter
provide a formal discussion of this argument.6 The Saikkonen-L utkepohl test is therefore
appealing for a grid search over all possible combinations of break dates. A Monte Carlo
study, summarized in Table 1.5, shows evidence for the practical relevance of our joint
estimation procedure.
The joint estimation procedure starts by assigning the optimal lag length, p, to each
possible combination of break dates,  = (T1;T2)0. Since, at this point, we do not have
any information about the \exact" timing of the breaks and the proper rank specication
the level VAR version of (1.10)|which is unrestricted with respect to the cointegrating
rank|proves to be useful (see Appendix Appendix 1.1). We estimate this version of (1.10)
allowing for a maximum of four lags, pmax = 4, and under the following denition for T1
and T2. Let the breaks be at a xed fraction, 1 and 2, of the sample size. Then,
T1 = [1T] and T2 = [2T] with 0:1  1 < 2  0:9; (1.11)
in which we impose a 10 percent trimming to eliminate endpoints and [] denotes the integer
6 There is, however, a consistency problem inherent in the Saikkonen-L utkepohl procedure.
The parameter 0 in (1.7) is not fully identied. It cannot be estimated consistently in the
direction of ? and depends partly on the initial values in the procedure. This may be viewed as
a drawback of our model setup. Still, we obtain cointegrating rank tests with desirable properties
as there is a probability bound on the estimators Saikkonen and L utkepohl, (see, e.g., Saikkonen
and L utkepohl 2000b, Trenkler, Saikkonen and L utkepohl 2008)
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part of the argument. Moreover, we set 1 < 2 such that [1T]+pmax+k  [2T] in order
to avoid singularity in the estimation and to suciently identify the break parameters in
the cointegration space. For each of these possible pairs  = (T1;T2)0 we choose the
optimal lag length according to the corrected Akaike information criterion of Hurvich and
Tsai (1993) and denote it by p.7
The maximum of the LR-statistics determines then the cointegrating rank, r, and the












ln(1   j(p)) > LRc(~ r0;k) ~ r0 = 0;1;:::;r0   1; (1.13)
in which the j(p)'s are the ordered eigenvalues obtained by applying reduced rank regres-
sion techniques to the adjusted series, again, as in Johansen (1995). LRc() denotes the
critical values (see, e.g., Trenkler 2003, Table 2), for which we obtain p-values by approx-
imating the whole asymptotic distribution of the LR-statistic with a Gamma distribution
using the response surface procedure of Trenkler (2008). For r0 > 0 the constraint ensures
a supremum such that all LR-statistics for ranks lower than r0 are signicant at, say, the
10 percent level.
Finally, from the series of LR-statistics we pick the maximum as
LR = max
r0=0:::;k 2
LR(p;r0) such that LR > LRc(r0;k); (1.14)
and select the corresponding break dates, ^ p, and cointegrating rank, ^ r = r0 + 1. If the
inequality never holds there is no evidence for cointegration. According to Assumption
1.2 we exclude the alternative ^ r = k (stationarity) and therefore the rank of  in (1.9)
can be at most k   1.
7 The Hurvich-Tsai criterion is a correction to Akaike's (1974) criterion and is especially
designed for VARs: it makes use of a second order expansion of the Kulback-Leibler divergence
and has better small sample properties in VARs than the Akaike criterion.
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Table 1.1 conrms our hunch that a cointegrating rank of two is a proper choice in
both countries. We can reject both hypotheses (H0 : r0 = 0 and H0 : r0 = 1) at least at
the 8 percent level of signicance. By and large, the estimated break dates t well into
the discussion of historical events in Section 1.3.1. We defer a more in depth discussion of
the break dates to the point where we have all statistical facts at hand.
Table 1.1: Joint Estimation of Cointegrating Rank and Break Dates
Country H0 Lags, p Break dates, ^  Rank, ^ r LR-stat. p-value
USA r0 = 0 2 1958:1 1988:3 19:442 0:08
r0 = 1 2 15:370 0:00
CAN r0 = 0 4 1971:2 1976:2 20:363 0:06
r0 = 1 2 17:614 0:00
Notes: \Lags" is the order of the VECM in (1.10) which we assign to each possible pair of break
dates prior to our joint estimation procedure. We select p based on the unrestricted model (A1.1)
and the corrected Akaike criterion of Hurvich and Tsai (1993). The corresponding p-values of
the LR-statistics follow from the response surface procedure of Trenkler (2008).
Now with r = 2 and an optimal lag order p = 2 in the United States and p = 4 in
Canada we nd our VECMs to be adequate representations of the data generating process.
Although a multivariate Breusch-Godfrey test indicates some leftover autocorrelation we
continue our analysis with this lag specication: autocorrelation does not invalidate the
cointegration tests (L utkepohl and Saikkonen 1999). Moreover, increasing the lag order
does not x the problem.
Introducing breaks could potentially render the series trend stationary and Assump-
tion 1.2 obsolete. We use the minimum Lagrange multiplier unit root test of Lee and
Strazicich (2003) to bring clarity into this matter. The Lee-Strazicich test has several de-
sirable properties. Most importantly for our purpose is the inclusion of the breaks under
both the null and alternative hypotheses. A rejection of the unit root null hypothesis there-
fore implies unambiguously trend stationarity. Table 1.2 shows the test results. Based on
the model A version of the Lee-Strazicich test, the equivalent to our model setup in (1.7),
we cannot reject the null for none of the six series at levels lower than the 10 percent level
of signicance. A result which supports the appropriateness of our Assumption 1.2.
The property of an unaected limiting distribution is in stark contrast to a Saikkonen-
L utkepohl test with broken linear trends (see, e.g., Trenkler, Saikkonen and L utkepohl
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Table 1.2: Lee-Strazicich LM Unit Root Test with Two Level Breaks
Country Variable Lags, p Break dates, ^  LM-statistic CV (90%)
USA Labor income 8 1958:1 1988:3  2:188  2:763
Prots 8  2:531
Output 7  2:122
CAN Labor income 8 1971:2 1976:2  1:066  2:763
Prots 8  2:380
Output 8  0:664
Notes: Lee and Strazicich (2003) LM unit root test with two exogenous level breaks (their model
A). We determine the optimal number of augmented lags by the general-to-specic procedure,
starting with a maximum number of pmax = 8 and using a 10 percent level of signicance as
the cut o for the last augmented lag. The 90 percent critical value is from Lee and Strazicich
(2003), Table 1.
2008) and to the other branch of cointegration tests with breaks, such as Johansen, Mosconi
and Nielsen (2000). These tests require a new set of critical values whenever the timing
of a break changes. These critical values are larger the more balanced the various regimes
are. Naturally, this property is unpractical for a grid search as it introduces a bias toward
picking one relatively long regime: a reason why we refrain from using broken linear trends
in our analysis.
To sum up, our joint estimation procedure provides a novel way to estimate cointe-
grating rank and break dates. It extends the two-step procedure of L utkepohl, Saikkonen
and Trenkler (2004) and Saikkonen, L utkepohl and Trenkler (2006) in which the break
dates follow from minimizing the determinant of the residual covariance matrix of the level
VAR version of (1.10) in a rst step. Then, in a second step, the cointegrating rank is
determined given the breaks. The use of dierent models at each step introduces a pre-test
bias into their procedure. We instead use the level VAR version only to assign the optimal
lag order to each possible pair of break dates. Therefore, our joint estimation procedure
removes one layer of uncertainty.
1.3.4 The Reduced-Form VECM Estimator with Parameter Restrictions
There is by now one dominant method for estimating a reduced-form VECM: the
reduced-rank maximum likelihood (ML) method of Johansen (1995). Although the ML
estimation of VECMs is quite common under practitioners it may produce occasional
outlying estimates of the cointegration parameters (see, e.g., Br uggemann and L utkepohl
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2005, Johansen 1995, p. 184). A feature arising through the lack of nite-sample moments
of the estimator (Phillips 1994).
Instead we use a two-stage feasible generalized least squares (GLS) estimator which
does not share the unpleasant feature of the ML estimator. This alternative estimator for
VECMs was rst proposed by Ahn and Reinsel (1990). In addition, it oers a computa-
tionally simple and unproblematic way to place restrictions on the cointegrating matrix.
Since the two-stage feasible GLS method has not attracted much attention under practi-
tioners we brie
y introduce the estimator here (see, e.g., L utkepohl 2005, Chap. 7.2.2 for
a textbook treatment).
Consider a general k-dimensional sample fytgT
t=1 with pre-sample values fytg0
t=1 p.
To estimate the VECM specication in (1.10), let us dene the variable matrices Y =
(y1;:::;yT), Y 1 = (Xlr
0 ;:::;Xlr
T 1), and X = (Xsr
0 ;:::; Xsr
T 1) in which the
long-run (\lr") and short-run (\sr") matrices are Xlr
t 1 = (yt 1;d1t 1;d2t 1)0 and Xsr
t 1 =
(yt 1;:::;yt p+1;1T; d1t;:::;d1t p+1;d2t;:::;d2t p+1)0. As in Section 1.3.2, we
dene the nd = 2 break dummies fditgT
t=1 p, i = 1;2 such that the sequence is one for
t  Ti and zero otherwise. The corresponding parameter matrices are  = 0 with
 = ( : 1 : 2), and   = ( :  1 :  :  p 1 : 
10 :  : 
1p 1 : 
20 :  : 
2p 1).
Then, the VECM (1.10) rewritten in matrix notation is
Y = Y 1 +  X + U; (1.15)
for which we can write the OLS estimator as
h

















Our focus is now to disentangle the cointegration matrix  from . For this purpose
we work with the concentrated version of the VECM and replace the short-run parameters
with their OLS estimators given , i.e.
R0 = R1 + U = 0R1 + U; (1.17)
in which R0 and R1 are the residual matrices from regressing Y and Y 1 on X. We
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1 . Together with the common identifying restriction  = (Ir : k r : 1 : 2)






1 + U: (1.18)






= R' + r; (1.19)
on the cointegration matrix 
k r = (k r : 1 : 2). ' is an unrestricted m  1 vector of
unknown parameters, while r is the r(k r+nd)-dimensional vector of imposed constants;
and R is an appropriately dened zero-one matrix of dimension r(k   r + nd)  m such
that (1.19) holds. A simple Wald test can be used to check the restrictions. Under the
null hypothesis of statistical valid restrictions the Wald statistic has an asymptotic 2-
distribution with the number of restrictions as degrees of freedom (see, e.g., L utkepohl
2004).
We conne ourselves to allowing restrictions on the cointegration matrix only. Our
sole aim is to have a statistical tool for analyzing the structural breaks we have estimated
with our joint estimation procedure. Essentially, we are testing the signicance of the
individual break parameters in the 1 and 2 vectors. Since in (1.10) the 's are linear
combinations of the 's from our data generating process, a zero restriction here does not
automatically imply a zero restriction there. As such, we estimate the parameter vectors
of the impulse dummies|the 
's in (1.10)|unrestrictedly. According to Saikkonen and
L utkepohl (2000a), ignoring any form of restrictions on the impulse dummies will not do
great damage to the other estimators.
We plug the restrictions (1.19) into the concentrated model (1.18) and solve for the
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To make GLS operational (i.e. feasible) we need to replace the loading matrix, , and
the residual covariance matrix, u, with consistent estimators. For u such an estimator
follows from (1.16) and (1.15) in the usual way and for  from the rst r columns of b . The
estimator for  is a direct implication from the common identifying restriction we have
imposed on . We denote the resulting feasible GLS estimator by  '. The unrestricted
version of  ' is available by dening R as an identity matrix of dimension r(k   r + nd)
and r as a vector of zeros.
Proposition 7.6 in L utkepohl (2005) shows the asymptotic properties of the estimator.


















( '   ')   N (0;Ik); (1.21)
in which  ' converges to its true value at the rate T, faster than the usual rate
p
T.
It is therefore what we call a super-consistent estimator. Whether we impose a known
cointegration matrix  or estimate it will not aect the asymptotic distribution of the
OLS estimators of  and   in (1.16).
Then, given the super-consistent estimator  ', we can construct   = (Ir :  
k r)0 from
(1.19) and consistently estimate all the other parameters in the VECM in a second stage.
With   and possible zero restrictions of the form
vec( :  ) = S#; (1.22)









S# + vec(U); (1.23)
in which S is a xed zero-one matrix of dimension k(rk(p 1))n and # is a n-dimensional
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A consistent estimator for the residual covariance matrix, u, is readily available from
the rst stage and, as before, the feasible GLS estimator of # goes in distribution to a
Normal (see L utkepohl 2005, Proposition 7.7):
p
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XY 0












in which  # converges to its true values at the rate
p
T. A Wald test is again available to
check the statistical validity of the restrictions.
1.3.5 Taking Stock
We now put the bits and pieces of the preceding sections together and present the
results of the long-run parameters and the breaks. In addition, we provide evidence for the
practical relevance of the two-stage feasible GLS estimator and a Monte Carlo study to
assess the performance of our joint estimation procedure of cointegrating rank and break
dates.
Two results stand out from Tables 1.3 and 1.4. First, there is no evidence for structural
breaks in Canada. A joint test for the exclusion of the breaks cannot be rejected by a
Wald test (2(4) = 2:128 [0:71]). For this result we get further support from a standard
Saikkonen-L utkepohl cointegration test without breaks: we still nd two cointegration
relations. Unlike Canada, the 1958:1 and 1988:2 breaks in the United States are partly
necessary to reveal a cointegrating rank of two. These dates t well into our discussion of
the historical developments in Section 1.3.1. Specically, the rst break is only signicant
in the labor income-output equation and adjusts for the long and steady increase of the
labor income share after World War II while the 1988:3 break captures the U-shaped
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Table 1.3: United States: Estimated Long-Run Parameters
Model Labor income Prots Output Break, T1 Break, T2
1958:1 1988:3
M0:  0 1:000 0:000  1:024  0:037 0:038
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
0:000 1:000  0:801 0:035  0:267
(0.129) (0.127) (0.123)




M1:  0 1:000 0:000  1:000  0:045 0:000
(0.008)
0:000 1:000  0:865 0:000  0:116
(0.078) (0.091)
Wald statistic: 2(3) = 4:020 [0:26]




Wald statistic: 2(1) = 0:173 [0:68]
Notes: Estimation by two-stage feasible GLS with p = 2 lags. The corresponding standard errors
of the parameters are in parentheses; the p-values of the Wald statistics are in brackets. In the
second stage (equation (1.22)), we estimate the loading matrix,  , either under M0 or M1 by
taking the cointegration matrix,  0, from the rst stage (equation (1.19)) as given. The imposed
restrictions represent the maximal possible number that cannot be rejected by a Wald test.
prole of the prot share. As we see from the empirical evidence here, our notion of a
structural break as rare events that disguise the \true" cointegrating rank seems to be
appropriate.
The second result is that a permanent increase in output sets in motion a redistribu-
tion from labor income toward prots in Canada, whereas in the United States we observe
a redistribution away from prots in favor of other non-labor incomes, such as capital
gains and dividends. A Wald test cannot reject a one-by-one long-run movement of labor
income and output (see the joint test with the breaks: 2(3) = 4:020 [0:26]), while the
long-run output elasticity of prots is signicantly below one (0.87 percent). Since our
measures of labor income and prots do not (and must not) add up to output, a per-
manent increase in output sets in motion a redistribution toward the \missing" part of
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Table 1.4: Canada: Estimated Long-Run Parameters
Model Labor income Prots Output Break, T1 Break, T2
1972:2 1976:2
M0:  0 1:000 0:000  0:911 0:012 0:009
(0.038) (0.039) (0.041)
0:000 1:000  1:420  0:030 0:260
(0.297) (0.306) (0.321)




M1:  0 1:000 0:000  0:896 0:000 0:000
(0.021)
0:000 1:000  1:231 0:000 0:000
(0.169)
Wald statistic: 2(4) = 2:128 [0:71]




Wald statistic: 2(1) = 0:601 [0:44]
Notes: Estimation by two-stage feasible GLS with p = 4 lags. The corresponding standard errors
of the parameters are in parentheses; the p-values of the Wald statistics are in brackets. In the
second stage (equation (1.22)), we estimate the loading matrix,  , either under M0 or M1 by
taking the cointegration matrix,  0, from the rst stage (equation (1.19)) as given. The imposed
restrictions represent the maximal possible number that cannot be rejected by a Wald test.
overall prots, most importantly capital gains and dividends. This trend may re
ect the
relative dominant role of the stock market in the United States. Across the border in
Canada we estimate long-run output elasticities of labor income (0.90 percent) and prots
(1.23 percent) signicantly below and above unity. These long-run elasticities imply a
redistribution from labor income to prots in response to a permanent increase in output:
economic growth does not fully show up on Canadians' paychecks. This is a well-known
fact in Canada and part of the, sometimes tempered, political discussion.
The interpretation of cointegrating parameters as long-run elasticities can be prob-
lematic but works well in our case. The reason is the orthogonality property of the per-
manent change: it is orthogonal to both cointegrating vectors. To see why this property
holds, let us consider a permanent one-percent output change that entails|everything
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else equal|a permanent change of labor income by  13 percent.8 Having in mind
the parallel (unknown) eect on prots, say !, we model the permanent change c as
c(!) = ( 13;!;1;0;0). Then,
c0(!)
1 = ( 13;!;1;0;0)(1;0;13;11;12)0 = 0
c0(!)
2 = ( 13;!;1;0;0)(0;1;23;21;22)0 = ! + 23;
in which we can set ! =  23 to make c(!) orthogonal to both cointegrating vectors. It is
exactly this change in prots, the variable absent from the labor income-output relation,
that keeps the system on the attractor set. Only in cases where this condition is met, the
initial permanent change c produces the required eect and we can interpret  13 as the
long-run output elasticity of labor income. Likewise,  23 is the long-run output elasticity
of prots. This result is the essence of Propositions 1 and 2 in Johansen (2005).
As a cross-check for the robustness and practical relevance of the two-stage feasible
GLS estimator we compare our results with the ones from the reduced-rank ML method
of Johansen (1995). While for the United States the long-run parameters are practically
identical, the results for Canada are unreasonable and are quite likely outliers. For in-
stance, the output elasticity of prots is  19:03 in the unrestricted model (M0). We rule
it out as a valid result, both sign and size are economically implausible. In the same way,
including a linear trend in the cointegrating space causes troubles. In the United States,
it suggests an output elasticity of prots of  3:03. The results for Canada are similar.
Again, sign and size are hard to reconcile with common theoretical considerations on the
long-run relation between prots and output.
Table 1.5 presents the results from our Monte Carlo study on the performance of the
joint estimation procedure. We use the parameter estimates of the VECM in unrestricted
form (model M0) and simulate 1,000 series of the the original sample length using multi-
variate normal residuals. We impose structure on the residuals by pre-multiplying them
with the contemporaneous impact matrix B, where B is from the estimation stage. We
use the rst p observations (p = 2 in the United States and p = 4 in Canada) to initialize
8 13 is the output parameter in the labor income-output relation. Formally, in (1.10) we
have  =

1 0 13 11 12
0 1 23 21 22

, and we denote the rst and second rows of  by 
1 and 
2.
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Table 1.5: Joint Estimation Procedure: Monte Carlo Analysis
A. United States
47:1{87:3 87:4{88:2 1988:3 88:4{89:2 89:3{08:4 Sum
47:1{57:1 0.211 0.007 0.001 0.010 0.030 0.259
(0.41) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
57:2{57:4 0.044 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.019 0.071
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
1958:1 0.072 0.007 0.002 0.022 0.066 0.169
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.99)
58:2{58:4 0.059 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.050 0.127
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
59:1{08:4 0.110 0.021 0.008 0.031 0.209 0.379
(0.99) (0.95) (1.00) (0.97) (0.99)
Sum 0.495 0.040 0.018 0.074 0.372
B. Canada
61:1{75:2 75:3{76:1 1976:2 76:3{77:1 77:2{08:4 Sum
61:1{71:2 0.095 0.009 0.004 0.043 0.343 0.494
(0.88) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.99)
71:3{72:1 0.020 0.002 0.000 0.013 0.067 0.102
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.99)
1972:2 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.012 0.016
(0.50) (1.00) (0.92)
72:3{73:1 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.024 0.028
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
73:2{08:4 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.355 0.360
(1.00) (1.00) (0.99)
Sum 0.119 0.012 0.004 0.064 0.801
Notes: Data generating process based on the unrestricted parameter estimates (model M0, equa-
tion (1.10)) for the two countries. We present the relative frequencies (out of 1;000 replications)
of nding the break dates, ^ , in a specic time interval and report in parentheses the ratio of
how often the estimated cointegrating rank, ^ r, is r = 2 (at the 10 percent level of signicance).
all 1,000 runs. We then go through all the steps of Section 1.3.3, while keeping the lag
order p xed, and store the estimated break dates, ^ , and cointegrating rank, ^ r, in each
run. Table 1.5 shows the frequencies of ^  to lie in certain time intervals. Since the shift
magnitudes of the breaks are relatively small (see Tables 1.3 and 1.4), our test performs
modestly in nding the correct break dates. In an interval of plus-minus three quarters
around the two break dates the hit rate is 5.7 percent in the United States and 1.9 per-
cent in Canada. The somewhat larger shift magnitudes in the United States increase the
frequency of nding the break dates closer to the true ones. While, at rst glance, this
Hauzenberger, Klemens (2011), On the Dynamic Effects of Government Stimulus: Measures in a Changing Economy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/27895CHAPTER 1 28
performance seems to be rather disappointing, what matters most is the success of our
test to identify the correct cointegrating rank. In most instances the hit rate is a full 100
percent. Even when the estimated break dates are outside the plus-minus three quarters
intervals the cointegration test within our joint estimation procedure performs reasonably
well. As a benchmark, using the standard Saikkonen-L utkepohl cointegration test with-
out breaks, the frequency of nding the correct cointegrating rank is 17.4 percent in the
United States and 73.9 percent in Canada. With one exception in Canada, these hit rates
are signicantly lower than the ones from our joint estimation procedure. Especially so in
the United States where the shift magnitudes play a more important role than in Canada.
1.4 Empirical Results on Redistribution
After all these technicalities let us summarize the results of our estimations regarding
the eects of a redistribution from prots to labor income. In Figures 1.2 and 1.3 we
present the eects of the two components of a redistribution shock|labor income and
prots|individually. This intermediate step helps for a better intuition for the driving
forces behind the changes set in motion by a combination of these two shocks in the
redistribution experiment shown in Figure 1.4. Deriving an interpretation directly from
Figure 1.4 is in fact a bit tricky since both eects overlap and the behavior of workers and
rms and the respective aggregates becomes less clear.
Although the original estimates have the dimension of elasticities, it is more intuitive
to discuss the results on a dollar for dollar basis. As such, we work with derivatives
evaluated at the point of means. Moreover, when we talk about \dollars" we do not
distinguish between United States an Canadian dollars for ease of reading. This would
anyway be only a matter of labeling a unit.
Throughout the discussion of the results we mostly focus on the model with parameter
restrictions (M1) which is our preferred model based on the discussion above. However,
to check the robustness and sensitivity we report the results from the unrestricted model
M0 as well.
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1.4.1 Contemporaneous Eects
Table 1.6 reports the estimation results for the B matrix of the structural model (1.1).
The estimation procedure follows Section 1.2 which we extend to allow for over-identifying
restrictions on the B matrix in the restricted model. Four results stand out. First, the
contemporaneous eect from a labor income shock on output dominates the one from a
prot shock, i.e. b32 < b31. Specically, a one-dollar shock to labor income increases
output within the quarter by about 1.15 dollars in both countries. Thus, there is a modest
impact multiplier eect at work creating these 15 cents in excess of the initial one-dollar
input through the swift eect of the induced extra spending on aggregate demand. In
the case of a one-dollar prot shock the retarded capacity eect implies a less than unity
increase in output: 0.68 dollars in the United States and 0.82 dollars in Canada.
The second result is that the correlation between the reduced-form labor income
and prot residuals is relatively high in the United States (about 0.43 in our sample)
yielding a positive eect from a labor income shock on prots (b21 = 0:47). From a
methodological point of view this eect implies that to achieve a one-dollar redistribution
from prots to labor income we have to take away more than one dollar from rms, 1.47
dollars to be exact. In Canada the eect from a labor income shock on prots is, if at all,
slightly negative which is a direct consequence of the low correlation between the reduced-
form residuals ( 0:05). In model M0 this eect is a mere  0:03 and rather imprecisely
estimated. Moreover, a Wald test cannot reject the over-identifying restriction b21 = 0.
The parameter is therefore absent from M
1.
Third, the parameters b13 and b23 indicate the qualitative eect of the automatic
responses. Indicative only because b13 and b23 subsume various other eects, for instance
the marginal propensities to spend, as in (1.2). The sign of the parameters, however, may
ultimately be driven by the sign of the respective automatic response (see Remark 1.1).
Both automatic response channels seem to be positive in the United States, whereas in
Canada the eect, if any, might be negative.
Fourth, the bootstrapped standard errors under M0 are quite large which points to-
ward a problematic identication and estimation of at least some of the parameters. These
problems disappear in the model with parameter restrictions (M
1), where we observe a
considerably reduced estimation uncertainty. Still, we might underestimate the \true"
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Table 1.6: Contemporaneous Eects
Country Model b31 b21 b32 b13 b23
USA M0 coe. 1:199 0:473 0:663 0:190 0:194
std.err. (0.732) (0.473) (0.660) (0.225) (0.358)
M
1 coe. 1:156 0:471 0:682 0:205 0:186
std.err. (0.466) (0.178) (0.225) (0.119) (0.144)
CAN M0 coe. 1:283  0:026 0:592  0:336 0:263
std.err. (0.360) (0.074) (0.354) (0.332) (0.744)
M
1 coe. 1:295 0:000 0:822  0:360 0:000
std.err. (0.242) (0.355) (0.224)
Wald statistic: 2(2) = 5:388 [0:068]
Notes: The parameter estimates refer to the B matrix in equation (1.1) under the short-run
identifying restriction b12 = 0. Model M0 is the same as in Tables 1.3 and 1.4. Model M
1
extends M1, the one with parameter restrictions in the long-run relations, and provides a test
for the over-identifying restrictions on the B matrix. We present the parameters as derivatives
evaluated at the point of means and express them as dollar for dollar. b31 and b32 are the eects
of labor income and prot shocks on output; b12 and b21 are the eects of a prot shock on labor
income and vice versa ; and b13 and b23 indicate the direction (not the size) of the automatic
responses. The imposed restrictions represent the maximal possible that cannot be rejected by
a Wald test. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (2,500 replications, see Appendix
Appendix 1.2).
estimation uncertainty as we take the restrictions as given in the bootstrap procedure.
What could be the economic explanations behind these results and the dierences
between the two countries? In the following we shortly discuss two arguments which
might comprise important and reasonable explanations.
A rst argument could be that the stronger exposure of Canada to international trade
brings some unwelcome side eects of a positive labor income shock: an increase in unit
labor costs and a loss in competitiveness. These eects will reduce exports and may undo
any additional prot opportunities arising through the boost in domestic demand. The
automatic response channel from output on prot is, therefore, absent in Canada (b23 = 0).
A second potential explanation could lie in dierent expectations of Americans and
Canadians. The prospects about the benecial eects of a labor income shock may heavily
in
uence the decisions of American rms and workers. These positive expectations, then,
reinforce the spending eects already within the quarter. Labor income reacts by more
than the initial one-dollar shock (b31 = 1:16) and prots increase by 0.47 dollars. In
Canada the picture is less clear. Labor income still reacts by more than the initial input
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(b31 = 1:30), but it does not create the additional boost as in the United States. Firms
just manage to maintain their prot levels (b21 = 0). Canadian rms might interpret a
labor income shock in terms of a cost shock and hence do not increase capacities. An
explanation for the dierent interpretations may be the fact that over the last 40 years
the quantitative signicance of unions and collective bargaining drifted apart in the two
countries, with Canada experiencing an increasing unionization and higher bargaining
power of workers (Riddell 1993). On the other hand, the eect on Canadian output of
a prot shock is with 0.82 dollars relatively high. Taken together, these results give the
hunch that spending drives the formation of expectations in the United States, whereas
capacity considerations may be the driving factor in Canada.
1.4.2 Dynamic Eects of a Labor Income Shock
Figure 1.2 depicts the eects of a one-dollar labor income shock. One would expect
a positive eect on the level of output mainly driven by additional spending. This eect
can clearly be seen in the response of output. It is about one-for-one on impact with a
multiplier eect at work thereafter, reaching a peak three quarters out at 1.92 dollars in
the United States and 1.45 dollars in Canada after one quarter. Output starts then to
decline in both countries but rather abrupt in Canada with the eect becoming statis-
tically insignicant already after four to ve quarters. The impulse responses from the
unrestricted and restricted models lie practically on top of each other. Apparently, the
exact specication of the restrictions on the breaks and the contemporaneous eects does
not really matter here.
The formation of expectations after a labor income shock drives the dynamic pattern
in the Unites States. Workers increase their spending and rms will produce more by
using idle capacities or by investing in new capacities. This positive short-run eect is
then phasing out over the medium-run as workers ask for higher wages in return for
higher productivity and additional labor demand. As a consequence, prots eventually
go below trend after six quarters. Together with the general upward adjustment of prices
this \classic" channel explains the pronounced hump-shaped response of labor income and
output.
In Canada only higher labor income drives the multiplier process. The missing positive
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Figure 1.2: Response to a One-Dollar Labor Income Shock
Notes: The thick solid line depicts the impulse response from the model with parameter restric-
tions on the cointegration and contemporaneous impact matrices (model M
1), surrounded by
bootstrapped one-standard error bands (2,500 replications, see Appendix Appendix 1.2). The
dashed line with circles depicts the response based on the VECM with no parameter restrictions
(model M0).
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impact on rms arises, perhaps, through a dierent formation of expectations or a loss
of competitiveness as discussed above. When hit by a labor income shock the spending
stimulus does not lead Canadians to revise their expectations as much as their colleagues
across the border. This dierence induces a much faster decline of output in Canada and a
relatively strong negative prot eect that reaches its trough seven quarters out at  0:48
dollars.
1.4.3 Dynamic Eects of a Prot Shock
Let us now turn to the eects of a one-dollar prot shock. We model a negative shock
because of its later relevance to resemble a redistribution shock toward labor income
according to Denition 1.1. Theoretically, the lower prots will have a negative eect on
capacity decisions and will, perhaps, lead to a revision of expectations. In a standard AS-
AD model (see, e.g., Blanchard 2009) prices will then adjust downward over the medium-
run and output reverts to its initial trend.
Figure 1.3 shows the empirical pattern. In the United States prots start recovering
more or less right away, whereas in Canada prots respond in a hump-shaped manner,
reaching a trough four quarters out at -1.51 dollars. By our short-run identifying as-
sumption (b12 = 0), labor income does not change on impact, decreases then relatively
smoothly before it reverts to trend. The trend reversion is particularly pronounced and
slow in Canada. Output initially decreases by 0:68 dollars and reaches a trough at  0:99
dollars after four quarters in the United States;  0:82 dollars on impact and a trough at
 1:91 dollars eight quarters out in Canada. Besides the much larger (negative) multiplier
eect the output response in Canada shows more persistence.
Again, the formation of expectations may play a crucial role. After a prot shock,
rms will reduce capacities or postpone investment projects and workers will cut down
spending eventually. Especially in Canada, the decrease of output by 0.82 dollars on
impact, and prots much below par, puts pressure on the labor market. A situation in
which rms may become tougher on wage negotiations or adjust employment, thereby
reinforcing the negative eect on labor income and output, making the recovery a long
one.
The specication of the restrictions, on the breaks in particular, matter more than in
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Figure 1.3: Response to a (Negative) One-Dollar Prot Shock
Notes: The thick solid line depicts the impulse response from the model with parameter restric-
tions on the cointegration and contemporaneous impact matrices (model M
1), surrounded by
bootstrapped one-standard error bands (2,500 replications, see Appendix Appendix 1.2). The
dashed line with circles depicts the response based on the VECM with no parameter restrictions
(model M0).
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the labor income shock scenario. While in the United States the impulse responses from
the restricted and unrestricted model are virtually the same, the unrestricted model (M0)
would underestimate the eects on labor income and output in Canada.
1.4.4 Dynamic Eects of a Redistribution Shock
Denition 1.1 shows how to linearly combine the labor income and prot shocks to
get an exact one-dollar redistribution on impact. Figure 1.4 shows the dynamic eects of
a redistribution toward labor income.9
What may take one by surprise at rst, turns out to be the central dierence in
the adjustment to a redistribution shock in the two countries. The prot response in
Figure 1.3 is pretty much the mirror image of the labor income response in Figure 1.2
and vice versa. Following our discussions of the single shock scenarios, this cross-pattern
veries our hunch of a dierent formation of expectations in the two countries. Depending
on whether expectations manifest through a stimulation of spending, as in the United
States, or the adjustment of capacities, as in Canada, the transmission of a redistribution
shock diers. Specically, in the United States, output increases on impact by 0.15 dollars,
reaches a peak two quarters out at 0.51 dollars and dips below trend after eight quarters
before it steadily reverts to trend. Although in Canada output initially increases by 0.47
dollars, it takes a rather persistent nosedive of 1.73 dollars within the rst eight quarters.
Put another way, Canadians would benet more form a redistribution toward prots.
When the transmission of a redistribution shock has a strong spending component,
as in the United States, the response of output should be similar to the ones from other
attempts to stimulate the economy through a spending stimulus. In fact, the estimated
output response for the Unites States is akin to the one Corsetti, Meier and M uller (2009)
get from a scal stimulus in which a debt-stabilizing policy systematically reduces spending
below trend over the medium-run.
1.5 Conclusions
Our paper contributes to the debate about the output eects of a redistribution be-
tween labor income and prots. Fiscal stimulus packages or monetary policy measures,
9 The eects of the opposite experiment would be exactly symmetric.
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Figure 1.4: Response to a One-Dollar Redistribution from Prots to Labor Income
Notes: The thick solid line depicts the impulse response from the model with parameter restric-
tions on the cointegration and contemporaneous impact matrices (model M
1), surrounded by
bootstrapped one-standard error bands (2,500 replications, see Appendix Appendix 1.2). The
dashed line with circles depicts the response based on the VECM with no parameter restrictions
(model M0).
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which might have triggered o the recovery after the 2009 crisis, inevitably imply a shift
of income between labor and prots. In a more general view the discussion in our paper
therefore relates to a long-standing debate on wage-led versus prot-led economic expan-
sion. While most of the recent research focuses directly on the eects of government
spending, we elaborate on the possible benecial output eects of redistributing resources
from prots toward labor income. A positive output eect, at least over the short-run,
requires two main ingredients: a marginal propensity to spend out of labor income which
exceeds the one of rms to spend an additional dollar of prots, and a medium-run ca-
pacity eect, brought about by lost prot opportunities, that does not crowd out the rst
eect too strong and too quickly.
We study how these opposing eects shape the output response in a 3-dimensional
structural VECM with up to two breaks at unknown time using quarterly data on labor
income, prots and output. Our analyzes focuses on the post-World War II economies of
the United States and Canada. While in the United States, a one-dollar redistribution
from prots to labor income, in fact, increases output long enough to call the experiment a
success, the redistribution fails to produce the welcome output stimulus in Canada. After
a short-lived output gain the Canadian economy plunges persistently below trend. As
our VECM bestows the symmetry property, this results actually suggests a redistribution
toward prots.
We discuss several related economic arguments in turn to provide explanations for
our results. One argument concerns the formation of expectations generally. American
rms and workers thrive on the spending stimulus triggered o by the labor income shock.
This positive impulse on expectations overcompensates the eects from the negative prot
shock. The United States economy therefore expands after a one-dollar redistribution
toward labor income, at least over the short-run. In Canada the revision of expectation
is however not strong enough to absorb the eects from the decline of prots. Stated
dierently, growth is wage-led in the United States whereas it is prot-led across the
border. Finally, because of the stronger exposure of Canada to international trade, a labor
income shock brings some unwelcome side eects: an increase in unit labor costs and a loss
in competitiveness. These eects will reduce exports and may undo any additional prot
opportunities arising through the boost in domestic demand. The automatic response
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channel from output back on prots is, therefore, absent in Canada while it is positive in
the United States.
Developing a proper econometric tool that jointly estimates break dates and cointe-
grating rank was, besides the economic question, the main objective of our paper. We
provide Monte Carlo evidence showing the basic consistency of this joint estimation pro-
cedure.
The low-dimensionality of the VECM helps to keep econometric issues with break
dates, cointegration, and identication at a minimum but, at the same time, limits the
accuracy of our economic explanations. In ongoing work we draw on our conclusion from
this paper and build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model which can
explicitly shed more insights on the transmission mechanism of a redistribution shock.
Furthermore, allowing for country interdependencies, for instance, or comparing evi-
dence across a larger set of countries strikes us as promising directions for future research.
The global error-correcting framework of Pesaran, Schuermann and Weiner (2004) or the
global VAR of Dees et al. (2007) may be good starting points for an extension along this
line. An extensive cross-country study was beyond the scope of the paper. Our results
for the United States and Canada are, however, suggestive for the possible benets and
pitfalls of redistributing income between labor and prots.
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Appendix 1.1 The Reduced-Form Level VAR
The level VAR version of the VECM in (1.10) proves useful whenever we have to
make a statistical judgement, for instance about the lag order, before we have actually
determined the cointegrating rank. We leave the cointegrating rank unrestricted in (1.10),



















After some rearranging we get the mapping with the parameters in (1.7), (1.9), and (1.10)
as 
0 =  + 1, 
1 =  1, 
i =  i, 

i0 = i   
i , and 

ij = 
ij for i = 1;2 and
j = 1;:::;p   1. Obviously the linear trend has found its way back into the model. With
 being the identity matrix we can no longer maintain Assumption 1.2.
Appendix 1.2 Bootstrapped Standard Errors
All the results in Section 1.4 come with bootstrapped standard errors. While the
method is more general and applies to error bands for impulse responses and so on, we
show it with the help of the contemporaneous impact matrix B. We derive the covariance
matrix of B as




vec(^ Bn)   vec(^ B)
2
; (A1.2)
in which N is the number of bootstrap replications and ^ Bn is the estimate of the contempo-
raneous impact eect from the n-th replications. Using the estimate ^ B instead of the mean
value of all ^ Bn (n = 1;:::;N) in the bootstrap, automatically accounts for the stochastic
nature of the long-run constraint (see Section 1.2, Br uggemann 2006, Vlaar 2004).




Flexible Regime-Switching Projections to
Estimate the Dynamic Eects of a Government
Spending Stimulus
I use a novel way to assess the impact of a government spending stimulus
on U.S. activity in the postwar period. The novelty lies in the combination
of Jord a's (2005) 
exible projections with regime switches between reces-
sions and expansions. This combined approach has numerous advantages:
it captures asymmetries over the business cycle; it can approximate other
important smooth nonlinearities in the DGP; it is more robust to misspeci-
cation; and estimation can be simply done by least squares. I nd a stim-
ulus to be considerably more eective in recessions with a prolonged period
of high spending, steadily increasing output, surging federal debts, and well
working multiplier eect which, over time, drive debt levels back to trend.
During expansions, or in a symmetric model without regime switches, there
is only a short lived positive eect on output, too short for the multiplier
to kick in. Constraint in its capacity to increase taxes the government sys-
tematically cuts spending below trend to control the level of federal debts.
(JEL: E62, H30, H50, C32, C53)
Keywords: asymmetric eects of scal policy, spending reversals, local pro-
jections, regime-switching with smooth transition
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2.1 Introduction
The biblical story of Joseph and the Pharaoh was, perhaps, the rst documented
example of a successful economic stabilization plan. When Joseph tells the Pharaoh to
expect seven years of plenty followed by seven lean years, it was the Pharaoh's proper
grain management that helped to alleviate the woes of the famine. As the world economy
tiptoes back from the 2009 global recession, issues about the usefulness of such stabilization
or stimulation measures are again at the fore. But how eective should a government
spending stimulus be expected to be over the course of the business cycle and how will it
aect government spending in the future?
Most of the empirical research on postwar-U.S. data, however, focuses on issues related
to whether consumption will increase or decrease after a stimulus. The two extremes of a
continuum of approaches to address this question theoretically, the entirely Walrasian real-
business-cycle models and the traditional Keynesian models, while consistent about the
qualitative response of output, dier exactly with respect to the behavior of consumption.
And as always, the ingenuity of econometricians has generated results on both sides of
the question. The ongoing debate culminates in the recent empirical studies of ? and
Perotti (2007). While Ramey nds evidence in favor of real-business-cycle models, that
is consumption decreases in response to a stimulus, Perotti's evidence suggests that the
transmission is in the Keynesian tradition with positive eects on consumption.1
Although dierent in their conclusions and identication methods, these papers have
in common the use of inherently linear and iterative vector autoregressive (VAR) tech-
niques to derive impulse response functions. The linear and iterative nature has numerous
drawbacks: one cannot assess the eectiveness of a stimulus at various stages of the
business cycle, most importantly the size of the spending multiplier in recessions; other
nonlinearities in the underlying data generating process (DGP) can possibly bias the es-
timator; and misspecication of the DGP will be multiplied over the response horizon.
There are papers dealing with either of these issues in dierent contexts but there is no
empirical research trying to tackle them in a unied framework. Filling that gap is what
1 Other empirical studies, addressing more or less the same question, are Ramey and Shapiro
(1998), Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) and Cavallo (2005)|supporting Ramey's results;
and Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Mountford and Uhlig (2009), Caldara and Kamps (2008), and
Gal , L opez-Salido and Vall es (2007)|supporting Perotti's results.
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I do in this paper.
To this end, I modify and combine two strands of research. The rst ingredient
is the local projection method of Jord a (2005). The method exploits the eciency of
VARs for one-step ahead forecasts (even if the model may be misspecied, see Stock
and Watson 1999) and instead of iterating these forecasts forward we simply estimate
a separate VAR for each impulse response horizon. As such, impulse responses by local
projections are relatively robust to misspecications. Moreover, the whole method is quite

exible as one can easily increase the t of each projection by using a smooth nonlinear
approximation|a Taylor series expansion|to the unknown DGP. The second ingredient,
as in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010), constitutes a regime-switching VAR model
where a business cycle indicator assigns weights to each observation or, say, probabilities
of being in either a recession or expansion through a logistic transition function. I call the
combined method 
exible regime-switching projections.
To identify a government spending stimulus I take the method of Blanchard and
Perotti (2002), and Perotti (2007) as the point of departure. Decision and implementation
lags in the political process, which take presumably longer than a quarter, imply little
or no discretionary response of government spending to unexpected events. Therefore, a
stimulus can be disentangled from the residuals of the rst 
exible projection (essentially
the usual VAR) by means of a Choleski decomposition with government spending ordered
rst. Implementation lags, however, may obscure the identication and the disentangled
stimuli might in fact be a mix of anticipated and unanticipated changes: the critique of
Ramey (2011). One way to handle this problem and to get \truly" unanticipated stimuli is
to use a proxy for future government spending. One such proxy is the expected discounted
value of military expenditures, a series developed by Ramey (2009).2
Two empirical results stand out: (1) during expansions, or in a symmetric model
without regime switches, the government typically reduces spending below trend after a
stimulus, and (2) the stimulus is considerably more eective in recessions. While both nd-
ings square well with political economy arguments, the rst result was mostly overlooked
in the empirical and theoretical literature. In a recent paper, Corsetti, Meier and M uller
2 This way to solve, or at least mitigate, the anticipation problem was pointed out by Jordi
Gal  in his NBER discussion of an earlier version of Ramey (2011); see also Zubairy (2009).
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(2009) highlight these medium-term spending dynamics|dubbed as spending reversal|in
a standard new-Keynesian model with a debt-sensitive scal policy rule. The problem lies
more in the empirical justication of this quite intuitive theoretical result. Using quarterly
postwar-U.S. data, the results of linear and iterative VAR techniques show little, if any,
tendency toward a spending reversal,3 nor is the reversal a spurious result of the 
exible
projections. The projections nest linearity and, as shown in the Monte Carlo experiment of
Jord a (2005), they in fact detect linearity if present. The reason for not nding a spending
reversal with linear and iterative VAR techniques can be found elsewhere. Except until
recently the use of scal policy in the U.S. as a stabilization device has gradually vanished
(see, e.g., Solow 2005). This gradual change (i.e. smooth nonlinearity), together with the
Great Moderation, may lead to biased estimators in linear models.
The spending reversal is not characteristic for recessions, however, at least over a
horizon of three years. The stimulus, then, sets in motion a steady increase in output and
consumption with a cumulative multiplier eect on output of approximately two dollars.
This multiplier eect is considerably higher than the modest eect|around one in value|
I estimate in expansions or which we typically nd in papers in the traditional linear and
iterative fashion. With spending persistently above trend, federal debt levels initially
surge and reach a peak that is about three times as high as the initial one-dollar spending
stimulus. Then, after a year, the multiplier eect kicks in and federal debt levels revert to
trend. These debt dynamics, in a way, support the view of the current U.S. administration
that without spending driven growth now, future debt levels might be even higher. Finally,
the Fed stands ready and fosters the stimulus by lowering the federal funds rate.
2.2 The Modeling Cycle
To lay out the econometric methodology as plain as possible, I explain the estimation
and inference of impulse responses by 
exible projections rst in its symmetric version
before I elaborate on the regime-switching mechanism. This modeling cycle has emerged
naturally as I got more and more involved into the whole matter of characterizing the
eects of a government spending stimulus. An earlier version of the paper ignored asym-
3 A good reference is the large-scale comparative study of Caldara and Kamps (2008) on
VAR-based approaches to estimate the eects of scal stimuli.
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metries altogether; an ignorance which was especially unsatisfactory in light of the massive
stimulus programs that were launched during the 2009 global recession. The impulse re-
sponse functions capture history, the average values of output and so forth following a
stimulus. So, naturally, if one looks just on these average values in a symmetric frame-
work, it is hard to assert the much advocated spending multiplier. Nothing can be said
about the eectiveness of stimulus programs. In order to overcome this shortcoming,
Section 2.2.5 introduces a special regime-switching mechanism between recessionary and
expansionary periods.
2.2.1 Impulse Responses by Flexible Projections
The prevalent way to compute structural impulse response functions is to take the
dierence between two dierent realizations of the best (linear) mean-squared estimator
Et(yt+sj). The fytgT
t=1 sequence is identical up to yt 1, but one realization assumes
that there is an innovation at time t, while the other realization evolves along its regular
innovation-free path. Following Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996) we can write
IR(t;s;wi) = Et(yt+sjut = wi;ut+1 = 0;:::;ut+s = 0;yt 1;:::;yt p)
  Et(yt+sjut = 0;ut+1 = 0;:::;ut+s = 0;yt 1;:::;yt p) (2.1)
for s = 0;1;2;:::;h. yt and ut are the k-dimensional vectors of observations and reduced-
form residuals and wi is the k  1 vector containing the experimental innovations.
Jord a (2005) provides a way to apply (2.1) which is dierent from just iterating a
VAR model forward. Consider projecting yt+s onto the nonlinear space generated by


























This expression looks slightly intimidating but if we impose a few restrictions it boils down
to a tractable, yet 
exible, approximation which we can easily estimate by least squares.
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As in Jord a (2005) I restrict nonlinearities to yt 1, the terms involved in the impulse
response functions (this convention will become clear momentarily). I also do not allow
for cross-product terms and restrict yt 1 to be cubed at most.4 With these restrictions
(2.2) simplies to





Bi;s+1yt i + us;t+s (2.3)
for s = 0;1;2;:::;h 1. The collection of the h regressions are the 
exible local projections.
Without the squared and cubed terms the projections are local linear.
Given denition (2.1) we can now derive the impulse responses from the dierence of
the two realizations of the s-step ahead forecasts as
c IR(t;s;wi) =
n





^ Bsyt 1 + ^ Qsy2
t 1 + ^ Csy3
t 1
o
= ^ Bswi + ^ Qs(2yt 1wi + w2




for s = 0; 1; 2; :::; h and with B0 = Ik, Q0 = 0k, and C0 = 0k. Obviously, the responses
will dier over the possible range of experimental values for yt 1. In order to have impulse
responses comparable to the ones we get by standard linear and iterated methods or by
projections without the squared and cubed terms we need to evaluate (2.4) at the sample
mean of yt 1.
The impulse responses are collections of local approximations which are optimally
designed for one-period ahead forecasts. Flexible projections are therefore robust to mis-
specication of the dynamic structure up to a certain extent. A benet which, however,
does not come without a cost: if we can actually identify the \true" data generating pro-
cess, estimating impulse responses by iterating this process forward in time will be more
ecient. First, with the 
exible projections we lose the entire impulse response horizon on
observations and, second, we impose less structure on the estimation problem. As Jord a
(2005) shows in a Monte Carlo experiment the loss of eciency is practically negligible.
4 Allowing for a more 
exible specication will consume a considerable amount of degree of
freedoms and, as Jord a (2005) points out, the gain of doing so is therefore small.
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The same Monte Carlo experiment conrms the consistency and underlines the benets of
the 
exible projection estimator. As a results, if the VAR is misspecied, 
exible projec-
tions are more accurate at capturing the specic patterns of the \true" dynamic structure.
Moreover, if the data generating process is linear the 
exible projections will virtually lie
on top of the true impulse responses.
Projections, in general, can also help on another front. Lin and Tsay (1996) demon-
strate that the projections, or direct forecasts in their terminus, perform better in the
presence of unknown unit roots and cointegration than iterating on a vector error correc-
tion model (VECM) even though we ignore unit roots and cointegration in the projections
altogether. In a VECM the uncertainty about the order of integration and cointegration
rank introduces another potential source of misspecication. In addition, Marcellino, Stock
and Watson (2006) describe situations, like low-order autoregressive processes or when a
series has a large moving-average root, where projecting locally has some advantages.
Flexible projections are, however, not a universal cure. Besides the eciency issue,
Kilian and Kim (2009) point out the lack of knowledge about the extent of small-sample
biases. We know little about these unwelcome eects for the properties of the 
exible
projection estimator, at least compared with the well-known small-sample biases in VARs
(see Pope 1990). So all in all, there is no denite answer to the question whether one
should back all his or her horses on 
exible projections or if one is well advised to stick
to standard VAR methods. As usual the question is ultimately an empirical one. The
important issue for this paper is to look at the traditional way to estimate the eects of
changes in government spending another way.
The next three subsections focus on the ingredients to compute and evaluate the
impulse response functions in (2.4): the estimation of the reduced-form parameters; the
identication of the innovation vector wi; and statistical inference.
2.2.2 The Reduced-Form Estimator with Parameter Restrictions
Besides the advantages (and disadvantages) just discussed, 
exible projections can be
easily implemented and estimated by least squares. As the squared and cubed terms may
play an important role in shaping the impulse responses and a large number of parameters
will imply imprecise estimates, I allow for zero restrictions that lead to a minimum value
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of a prespecied criterion at each impulse response horizon. The setup of the estimator is
as follows.
DEFINITION 2.1: Let us consider a k-dimensional sample fyt = y1t;:::;yktgT
t=1 of en-
dogenous variables augmented by k exogenous variables, fy
tgT
t=1. Taking into account the
order (p) of the autoregressive process and an impulse response horizon (h) the adjusted
length of the sample for the 




























t=p+j : j =  p + 1;:::; 1;0;1
Y = (Y0 : Y1 :  : Yh) : ~ T  k(h + 1)
X = (Y 1
0 : Y 2
0 : Y 3
0 ) : ~ T  3k
Z = (1 ~ T : Y 1
 1 :  : Y 1
 p+1 :
Y 
1 : Y 
0 :  : Y 
 p+1) : ~ T  ((p   1)k + 1 + (p + 1)k)
M = I ~ T   Z(Z0Z) 1Z0 : ~ T  ~ T





















: k(h + 1)  3k
in which Y contains all the regressands; X includes the linear, squared and cubed rst lag
regressors; Z captures all the other regressors with 1 ~ T denoting a column vector of ones with
length ~ T meant for the constant term; M is the associated projection matrix of Z; and ^ U
subsumes the residuals from the h projections. ^ 0:h collects the linear, squared and cubed
reduced-form impulse response parameters corresponding to the k variables; and let the
matrix ^ 0:h collect all the other parameters. I express each series in its demeaned version
which leads automatically to impulse responses evaluated at the sample mean, specically
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yt 1 = 0 in (2.4).
Now the reduced-form estimator of the local projections with parameter restrictions

































^ s : ^ s

= Rs^  s (2.6)
for s = 1;2;:::;h. As usual the operator vec() transforms a matrix into a vector by
stacking the columns and 
 denotes the Kronecker product. ^ s refers to the corresponding
row in ^ 0:h, ^  s is the m1 vector of non-zero parameters we want to estimate, and Rs is the
nm selector matrix. So m is the number of non-zero parameters that ultimately remain
in the model for a specic horizon, s, and n = k(1+(p+2)k+(p+1)k) is the total number
of parameters. To pin down Rs, I use a top-down strategy (see L utkepohl 2005, Chap. 5.2)
and start from an unrestricted model with p = 4 lags. The choice of four lags seems to be
common practice in the empirical scal policy literature and that is why I adopt it here.5
I then estimate each of the equations in the model separately and search over the set of
possible zero restrictions for individual coecients|excluding the constants|until I reach
the minimum of Akaike's (1974) criterion. The corresponding residuals of the restricted
model and the covariance matrix from the one-step ahead projections which I will use for
identication are
^ Us = Ys   (X : Z)(^ s : ^ s)0 and ^  = ^ U0
0 ^ U0 ~ T 1: (2.7)
To make generalized least squared operational (i.e. feasible) we need a consistent
estimator for s in (2.5). L utkepohl (2005) shows that we can use the covariance matrix
5 The reason for overruling information criteria in the empirical literature and mechanically
opting for four lags goes back to Blanchard and Perotti (2002). In their paper the goal was to
capture seasonal patterns in the collection of taxes by allowing for quarter dependence, hence, the
four lags. Although this seasonality is now typically ignored, Blanchard and Perotti's (2002) way
to pick the number of lags has remained.
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I ~ T   MX(X0MX) 1X0M

MYs
 ~ T 1: (2.8)
Propositions 2 and 4 in Jord a (2009) provide the asymptotic distribution of the im-
pulse responses ^ 0:h. In both stationary and non-stationary systems the deviations of
the estimated impulse responses from their \true" values go in distribution to a Normal
with a mean of zero and a covariance of 
. A consistent estimator for this impulse re-
sponse covariance matrix, 
, can be found in Proposition 2 of Jord a and Kozicki (2009).
Specically,
^ 





I ~ T   MX(X0MX) 1X0M

MY
 ~ T 1: (2.9)
Throughout the paper, the 3k2(h+1) square matrix ^ 
 will be the basis to compute stan-
dard error bands and to formally draw inference on the impulse responses. I deliberately
ignore here the previously imposed restrictions. Taking them into account would imply
to compute the numerous (h +1)(h+1) blocks in ^ 
 one at the time. In every case, by
ignoring the restrictions I in
ate the whole covariance matrix and, therefore, ^ 
 presents an
upper bound asymptotically for the restricted estimator (see L utkepohl 2005, Chap. 5.2).
Test statistics will be more conservative (i.e. less likely to reject a null hypothesis); not
an entirely unwanted side eect since it controls, although only rudimentary, for the un-
certainty with respect to the validity of the restrictions.
2.2.3 Short-Run Identication
At the heart of the VAR approach lies the timing assumption on decision and imple-
mentation lags: there is no automatic or discretionary response of government spending
to output and other shocks within the quarter. Hence, a stimulus can be identied by
means of a Choleski decomposition in which government spending comes rst in the list
of variables. If one, like me, is interested only in the response to a stimulus and if there is
no immediate feedback from other variables on government spending (see, e.g., Blanchard
and Perotti 2002), solving a recursive system is all that is needed. The ordering of the
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variables other than government spending is immaterial.6
DEFINITION 2.2: Let W be the lower triangular matrix obtained by a Choleski decompo-
sition of the covariance matrix of the one-step ahead projections in (2.7), i.e. ^  = ^ W ^ W0,






i;j=1;2;:::;k : k  k; m = 2;3;
as an element-wise matrix operation.
The structural innovations are then given by f^ "tgT h+1
p+1 = ^ U0 ^ W0 1 and the impulse
responses follow from (2.4) and the denition of ^ 0:h. Specically, ^ 0:h = ^ 0:h( ^ W0 : ^ W20 :
^ W30)0. The rst column of the ^ W matrix, say ^ w1, contains the relevant impact eects of a
stimulus. Because a structural innovation has unit variance, ^ W 1^  ^ W0 1 = Ik, a one-unit
innovation has the size of one-standard deviation.
Because ^ 0:h contains the impulse responses to all k possible shocks in the system,
we need a procedure to read out the responses to the rst shock (i.e. the stimulus). More
generally, let us dene the impulse response of variable i to a shock in variable j by the




0 in which eq is the q-th
column of Ik for m = i;j (see Jord a 2009). Then,
^ ij = Sijvec(^ 0:h) (2.10)
for i;j = 1;:::;k in general and for the impulse responses to a stimulus j = 1; i = 1;:::;k
in particular.
2.2.4 Standard Error Bands and Wald Statistics
When using short-run identication assumption through a Choleski decomposition we
can obtain the corresponding covariance matrix, 























6 See, for instance, Perotti (2007) for the same argument. Playing around with dierent
orderings did not produce any obvious dierences in the contemporaneous eects.
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in which the rst additive component re
ects the uncertainty associated with the reduced-
form impulse response parameters, ^ 0:h, and the second component incorporates the es-
timation uncertainty involved in the identication of ^ W.
The above expression looks a bit intimidating but computing the various subcompo-
nents turns out to be rather straightforward. Jord a (2009) summarizes the results for the
linear projections, the projections without squared and cubed terms. I provide the exten-
sion to accommodate those extra terms. Specically, from the link between the structural
and reduced-form impulse response parameters, ^ 0:h = ^ 0:h( ^ W0 : ^ W02 : ^ W03)0, it follows
@vec(^ 0:h)
@vec(^ 0:h)







^ 0:h(Ik : 2 ^ W0 : 3 ^ W20)0

:













k (^  
 ^ )D+0
k :
in which the vec() is dened as before, i.e. a column-stacking operator, and vech() is for
symmetric matrices and stacks the elements on and below the main diagonal only. The
elimination matrix, Lk, and the duplication matrix, Dk, link these two operators. For




k and thus D+
k vec(A) = vech(A). The commutation matrix, Kkk, links
the vec() operator itself in the form vec(A0) = Kkkvec(A).





vec(^ 0:h)   vec(0:h)

  N(0; ^ 
); (2.12)
which will be particularly useful to construct standard error bands and Wald statistics.
From the huge k2(h+1) square matrix ^ 
, which gathers all covariance structures across
the structural impulse responses, we can read out the actual covariance of the response of
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variable i to a shock j with the help of the selector matrix Sij dened in (2.10). Then,
^ 

ij = Sij^ 
S0
ij (2.13)
for i;j = 1;:::;k in general and for the responses to a stimulus i = 1; j = 1;:::;k in
particular.
We can now construct the error bands in the usual way as





in which the diag() operator transforms a square matrix into a column vector containing
the entries on the main diagonal, and z=2 denotes the appropriate critical value of a
standard normal random variable at the 100(1   ) condence level.
These error bands are, however, quite conservative as the presence of autocorrelation
between the impulse response parameters at horizon s with s   1 and so forth, carries
forward the variability of the estimates from one horizon to the next. Jord a (2009) provides
an in depth discussion of this autocorrelation issue. What is important here from his work
is the equivalence of standard Wald statistics, W
ij , of autocorrelated impulse response
parameters with the sum of individual t-statistics of which each of them is conditional on






ij(sjs   1;:::;1); i;j = 1;:::;k: (2.15)
Wald statistics implicitly control for the autocorrelation across the parameters and, there-
fore, give a better sense about the statistical signicance of impulse responses. The exact
expressions for the statistic of, say, the null of cumulative signicance up to a specic







s ^ ij)   2
(1); (2.16)
with RW
s = (1s : 0h s+1) being a zero-one row vector of length h + 1. I emphasize the
cumulative version of the test, as opposed to the more common test of joint signicance,
because in the light of a government spending stimulus and its consequences the cumulative
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eects will be the economically relevant ones. A test for the cumulative equality of two




































A   2
(1); (2.17)
in which RW
s = ( 1s : 0h s+1 :  1s : 0h s+1) is a zero-one row vector of length 2(h + 1)
and   is a proper scale factor.
2.2.5 Adding Asymmetries: Impulse Responses and Regime-Switching
The idea of impulse response analysis is old, as old as Quesnay writing on inter-
dependent systems (Fran cois Quesnay, Tableau  Economique, 1759). Despite that long
history, and even more so to the extent governments use scal policy in recessions to stim-
ulate demand, both the theoretical and empirical literature remained remarkably silent
on how the eectiveness of such a stimulation might vary over the business cycle. One
notable exception is Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010). They embed the structural
VAR method of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) to characterize the eects of a stimulus into
a regime-switching VAR where the transition across recessions and expansions is smooth.
Implementing the switching mechanism into the 



















 > 0; E(zt) = 0; Var(zt) = 1; (2.19)
for s = 0;1;:::;h   1. fztgT
t=1 is a standardized business cycle index, 
 controls the
smoothness of the transition across regimes, us;t+s are the reduced-form residuals from the
estimation stage, and ur
0;t with r = fR;Eg denote the individual residuals in recessions
and expansions. The logistic transition function (2.19) assigns weights (i.e. probabilities)
to each observation conditional on the state of the business cycle. Because of the weighing
we always exploit the variation in the entire sample, independent of which regime we are
going to estimate. A key advantage which is in stark contrast to methods where one
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splits the sample in two parts. Especially in recessions, with only a handful observations,
sample splitting is problematic: estimates will lack stability and precision. But, then, using
observations of one regime to estimate in part the dynamics of the other regime introduces
a bias toward not nding any dierences across regimes. Any identied dierences between
regimes will, therefore, be on the conservative side.
Besides the estimation of the regime-switching model (2.18), choosing a proper busi-
ness cycle index, zt, and calibrating the smoothness parameter, 
, are the main issues one
has to deal with in one way or the other.
Economic theory lacks a precise guideline for econometricians on how to choose a
business cycle index. At any rate, what one requires is a good match with the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) reference dates for U.S. recessions and expansions.
The NBER researchers Burns and Mitchell, in their 1946 seminal work, found that U.S.
business cycles typically last between six and 32 quarters. I adopt these limits in the
approximate band-pass lter of Baxter and King (1999) and applied to the growth rate of
output it yields a series where the troughs match the NBER recession dates well; as can be
seen in Figure 2.1. Because the band-pass lter explicitly allows to specify the periodicity
of the business cycle, I prefer it over Auerbach and Gorodnichenko's (2010) less 
exible
seven quarter centered moving-average lter.
One can estimate all the parameters in (2.18) jointly by conditional maximum likeli-
hood (see, e.g., Ter asvirta 2004, Arits, Galv~ ao and Marcellino 2007). As in Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2010), I follow a dierent approach and calibrate the smoothing parame-
ter 
 in the transition function (2.19) to match the 20 percent of time the U.S. economy
experienced a recession since 1955.7 Specically, Pr(zt  z) = 0:2 and at the \imagi-
nary" threshold z the logistic transition function (2.19) must assign a recession weight,
i.e. probability, of F(z) = 0:8. Under the assumption of a standard normal distributed
business cycle index, zt, we then get z =  0:84 and 
 = 1:65. Calibrating the smoothing
parameter, 
, in advance has one major advantage: given 
, and consequently F(zt), the
regime-switching model (2.18) turns out be linear in parameters and can be estimated by
least squares with the following setup.
DEFINITION 2.3: Let us append to the variables yt and y
t in Denition 2.1 the stan-
7 See the U.S. business cycle reference dates on http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html.
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Figure 2.1: Business Cycle Index and Recession Weights
Notes: The business cycle index ,zt, re
ects the periodic 
uctuations of the output growth rate
between six and 32 quarters; ltered using the band-pass lter of Baxter and King (1999) and
standardized. Appendix Appendix 2.1 has the details. Recession weights, F(zt), computed using
the logistic transition function (2.19) with a smoothing parameter of 
 = 1:65. Superimposed
are the peaks and troughs of the NBER business cycle dates, and the \imaginary" thresholds.
dardized business cycle index, fztgT
t=1, and the binary index, fzI
t gT
t=1, which takes on the
value one if t falls into a NBER recession period and zero otherwise. Further, transform





I keep the focus on dening the variables which characterize recessions; variables for ex-
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ZR = F
 
1 ~ T : Y 1 :  : Y p+1 :
Y 
1 : Y 
0 :  : Y 
 p+1

: ~ T  ((p   1)k + 1 + (p + 1)k)
^ UR = F
 
0 : ^ U0 :  : ^ Uh 1

: ~ T  k(h + 1)
^ R = ^ U0



























: k(h + 1)  3k
and X = XR : XE, Z = ZR : ZE, and ^ 0:h = ^ R
0:h : ^ E
0:h, in which I ~ T is a ~ T-dimensional
identity matrix; TR denotes the number of observations that fall in recessions;  Y R is the
respective mean; and everything else as in Denition 2.1.
With one exception the estimator of Section 2.2.2 goes through with the same notation
(equations (2.5) to (2.8)); identication and inference can be done as in Sections 2.2.3 and
2.2.4 by replacing all the variables with their regime-dependent counterparts. Only the
covariance matrix (2.9) of the reduced-form impulse responses has to be modied:
^ 





I ~ T   MX(X0MX) 1X0M

MY
 ~ T 1; r = fR;Eg:
(2.20)
The feature of the 
exible regime-switching projections to estimate each impulse
response horizon separately is in contrast to previous applications of non-linear time series
models for analyzing changes in the dynamic relationship between macro variables (see, e.g.
AGalv~ ao 2006). These applications typically specify only a one-period model and derive
forecasts or impulse responses for longer horizons by means of Monte Carlo methods to
take into account the nonlinearity of the conditional expectation. In the context of the
paper here, \endogenous" regime switches would then bring the responses in recessions
and expansions closer together, but Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010) nd only little
tendency toward such a narrowing in their one-period model.
The modeling cycle is now complete. The cycle is simple, yet rigorous, and keeps
the analysis strictly in the least squares fashion. The simplicity makes it appealing for
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applied researchers and as a fast-to-get benchmark for other more computational intensive
estimation methods.
2.3 Results of the Modeling Cycle
After all this rigor and technicalities one wants nally numbers; estimates not equa-
tions and denitions. Figure 2.2 plots the responses to a government spending stimulus
under symmetry, Figure 2.3 collects the dierent responses in recessions and expansions,
and Table 2.2 presents the size of the government spending multipliers. Appendix Ap-
pendix 2.1 describes the data in detail.
All models cover the time between the rst quarter of 1955 and the last quarter of
2009, and consist of six endogenous variables and one exogenous: the logarithms of real per
capita government spending, output, nondurable and services consumption, and federal
debt held by the public; the average personal income tax rate, the federal funds rate, and
as exogenous variable the defense news measure of Ramey (2011). The original estimates
of the responses will have the dimension of elasticities for the four logarithmic variables
and semi-elasticities for the two rates. To discuss and interpret the responses it is more
intuitive to translate the elasticities into derivatives. The response for the logarithmic
variables will therefore be on a dollar for dollar basis evaluated at the point of means.
While the responses of spending, output, and consumption are at the center stage, the
selection of the other variables follows two criteria. One is parsimony, to avoid estimating
a large number of parameters simultaneously and to keep the huge impulse response co-
variance matrix (2.9) tractable. The other one is to control for eects that would otherwise
bias the results. Specically, ignoring the debt dynamics after a stimulus and the possible
feedback eect from debts to spending can lead to such a bias. Favero and Giavazzi (2007)
emphasize the importance of this feedback channel. In the same vein, the eects of spend-
ing, taxation, and interest rates on output are presumably not independent. Estimating
the output eects of one variable, a model must include the others. Finally, Ramey's
defense news measure controls for anticipated government spending eects; the measure
is based on foreign political events, hence, exogenous in the model. From the day the
government starts discussing a stimulus package until it gets approved and pays out, there
may lie several months. If it takes more than a quarter the identied spending stimuli will,
Hauzenberger, Klemens (2011), On the Dynamic Effects of Government Stimulus: Measures in a Changing Economy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/27895CHAPTER 2 58
in fact, be anticipated. Or better say, anticipated and unanticipated eects get mixed up.
As our own behavior in general diers to events we know about to something that takes
us by surprise, keeping them separated as good as possible is important.8
There is another criterion hidden in my selection of variables: the choice of the average
personal income tax rate over total tax revenues. Choosing a rate is important for the
identication of Section 2.2.3 to go through. Any change in output has an immediate
feedback eect on tax revenues. Such a feedback renders the identication problem to be
non-recursive; a Choleski decomposition would no longer be applicable. By using a tax
rate I assume that the feedback on revenues and the tax base cancel out. Many other
papers like Perotti (2007), Ramey (2011), and Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004)
implicitly make the same assumption when the focus is on the eects of a government
spending stimulus and not on changes in taxes. Corsetti, Meier and M uller (2009), and
Fisher and Peters (2009) ignore taxes altogether in their empirical models.
2.3.1 Results under Symmetry
Now, under symmetry a one-dollar stimulus does not bring about the much wanted
government spending multiplier eect (see Table 2.2 and the thick solid lines in Figure
2.2). Output increases by roughly the same as spending: the multiplier is close to one
over the rst year before it gradually declines and eventually goes below zero. I dene the
multiplier here as the ratio of the accumulated output and spending responses. I prefer
the denition of a cumulative multiplier, advocated by Woodford (2010), over the usual
peak response measure, as it takes into account the in
uence of future spending levels on
the size of the multiplier.
And it is exactly the response of spending that distinguishes my results from most
others in the literature. While the 
exible projections uncover a strong reversion of spend-
ing below trend three years out, linear projections and standard VAR iterations predict
a quite persistent response of spending.9 The persistency is emblematic for the tradi-
8 See, for instance, Cochrane (1998) for an empirical paper on the dierent output eects of
anticipated and unanticipated monetary policy. Further, the idea of Fisher and Peters (2009) to
constructing news series for government spending on the basis of accumulated excess stock returns
of large U.S. military contractors is another promising way to control for anticipation eects.
9 Like Perotti (2007) and Ramey (2011) I use a VAR model with four lags and a linear trend
for the impulse responses by standard VAR iterations.
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Figure 2.2: Symmetric Impulse Responses to a Government Spending Stimulus
Notes: The thick solid lines are the responses calculated with 
exible projections, surrounded
by one-standard error bands. The dashed lines with circles depict the linear projections and the
dashed-dotted lines with triangles show iterated responses based on a VAR(4). \cum2", \cum4",
and \cumh" refer to the p-values of the null for the accumulated responses being equal to zero
after two and four quarters, and the entire response horizon. Eects are expressed as dollar for
dollar and as change in basis points to a one-percent spending shock (tax and fed funds rate).
Hauzenberger, Klemens (2011), On the Dynamic Effects of Government Stimulus: Measures in a Changing Economy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/27895CHAPTER 2 60
Table 2.1: Model Fit of Flexible and Linear Projections
Horizon s 1 2 3 4 6 8 10 12 16
A. Linear Projections
AIC  38:52  34:95  32:95  31:59  29:41  28:21  27:49  26:97  25:92
Parameters 81 73 74 71 74 79 73 75 62
B. Flexible Projections
AIC  38:61  35:43  34:22  33:37  32:24  31:67  31:30  30:89  29:47
Parameters 114 119 121 122 114 127 127 108 107
Notes: Akaike's (1974) information criterion; residuals and number of parameters retrieved from
the reduced-form estimator (2.5). I get the zero restrictions|excluding the constants|from
the top-down search algorithm, by means of minimizing the Akaike criterion for each horizon
s = 1;2;:::;16. For the linear projections, I set all parameters on the squared and cubed terms
to zero.
tional VAR-based literature (see, e.g., Caldara and Kamps 2008). A notable exception is
Corsetti, Meier and M uller (2009). They nd a strong reversion of spending below trend
and dub this behavior spending reversal. What makes the dierence in their analysis is the
use of federal debts as an additional regressor and a relatively short sample size, starting
in the rst quarter of 1980 only. If I was to trim my sample accordingly, I would arrive
at the same conclusion, which then again disappears if I was to omit the debt variable
from the model.10 The feedback from the level of debts to spending, as highlighted by
Favero and Giavazzi (2007), has some bite. Reasons for the subsample instability is the
Great Moderation on the one hand and, as Solow (2005) remarks, the gradual vanishing
of scal policy as stabilization device. The smooth nonlinearities the polynomial terms
in the 
exible projections can capture, seem to be a step in right direction to control for
these changes: in terms of model t the 
exible projections, though more variables have
to be estimated, outperform the linear ones. See Table 2.1 for the evidence. The lesson is,
if we were to take the responses from the linear projections and standard VAR iterations
as the true ones, we would get a misleading guide of the eects to a stimulus!
In Figure 2.2 the spending reversal also shows up in the responses of output and
consumption. Both increase statistically signicant over the rst quarters before they dip
below trend after about one and a half years. The one-dollar stimulus leads us, as the cogs
of the economy, to raise consumption by 0.25 dollars in turn. While consistent with the
10 Even in the 1955-1980 subsample I nd a tendency toward spending reversal. Although the
reversal is not complete, the response of spending is much less persistent than in the full sample.
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Table 2.2: Government Spending Multipliers
Horizon impact 2 qrts 4 qrts 8 qrts 12 qrts 16 qrts peak
A. Symmetric Case
Linear projection 0:97 0:96 1:02 1:08 1:24 1:28 1:30 (14)
(1:00) (0:69) (0:83) (0:73) (0:40) (0:20) (0:27)
Flexible projection 1:07 1:01 0:96 0:45  0:19  0:51 1:07 (0)
(0:74) (0:93) (0:92) (0:20) (0:01) (0:00) (0:74)
B. Flexible Regime-Switching Projections
Recession 0:34 0:33 1:26 1:65 1:99 | 1:99 (12)
(0:00) (0:00) (0:07) (0:06) (0:02) (0:02)
Expansion 1:27 0:56  0:44  2:47  3:37 | 1:27 (0)
(0:17) (0:19) (0:01) (0:00) (0:00) (0:17)
Notes: I dene the government spending multiplier as the ratio of the sum of the output response
to the sum of the government spending response up to the respective horizon. The p-values in
parentheses underneath indicate whether the multiplier is dierent from one. Next to the peak
response in parentheses is the quarter in which the multiplier reaches its maximum.
traditional Keynesian school of though, the raise does not accord well with the predictions
of standard real-business-cycle and new-Keynesian models. We supposedly feel us less
wealthy after a stimulus because of the higher tax burden that awaits us. Our rational
response, according to these models, would be to cut consumption and to work more.
This is the transmission mechanism Ramey (2011) nds with her narrative method based
on military events. Her nding crucially depends on the Korean War. Military spending
increased by 600 percent during the involvement in Korea and remained at elevated levels
thereafter. Using the narrative method and a sample excluding the Korean War, Caldara
and Kamps (2008), and Fisher and Peters (2009), among others, cannot nd a negative
consumption response.
Because of the reversal pattern in output and consumption the p-values, reported be-
low the graphs, lead to the conclusion of statistically non-signicant cumulative responses
over the entire forecast horizon of four years (cumh = 0:72 and 0:74). The economically
relevant null hypothesis is a range around half a year and one year, not longer. In that
range the eectiveness of a stimulus is typically assessed and further policy actions, if any,
will follow. At two and four quarters the cumulative output eect is highly signicant and
at least marginally signicant for consumption. A statistically signicant output response
is not yet what we need to assert if the stimulus was eective and created more money
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than the government pumped into the economy. The relevant null hypothesis for such a
question is whether the multiplier exceeds one. Table 2.2 reports, along with the multiplier
at various horizons, such test statistics: under symmetry the multiplier at two and four
quarters is statistically not dierent from one.11
In Figure 2.2 both federal debts and the average personal income tax rate increase,
whereas the federal funds rate meanders around zero and does not show a clear pattern.
The level of debts steadily increases, peaks at about one dollar ve quarters out, before
returning to its old level. Similarly, the personal income tax rate goes up by 14 basis
points (i.e. 0.14 percentage points) and reverts to trend thereafter. As we are dealing
with a rate here the initial stimulus has now the size of one percent. The cumulative null
hypotheses for debts and the income tax rate are statistically insignicant; they do not
respond \too" much. Such a response is emblematic for a government that wants to keep
debts under control after a stimulus but faces a constraint to raise taxes. What is left to
do to control the level of debts is a systematic cutting back of spending below trend: the
spending reversal.
In every case, under symmetry the evidence is in line with the view of Solow (2005).
According to him scal policy in the U.S. was harmless at best over the last 60 years and
de facto vanished as stabilization device from the political toolbox.
2.3.2 The Dierent Eects in Recessionary and Expansionary Periods
At the rst glance there is a remarkable dierence between the workings of a stimu-
lus in recessions (the solid lines with circles in Figure 2.3) and expansions. Remarkable
because the weighing of observations in the 
exible regime-switching projections, instead
of splitting the sample, introduces a bias toward not nding dierent responses across the
two regimes. The one-standard error bands do not intersect over extended periods and
we can safely reject the null hypotheses of cumulative equality for all variables except the
tax and fed funds rate. But sill, the rates respond quite dierently in the rst year and a
half.
11 As the multiplier is the ratio of the accumulated output and spending responses up to a
certain horizon s, I can transform the decision problem into a Wald test of the null of cumulative
equality, given by (2.17). The scale factor   re
ects the ratio of means between output and
spending; it accounts for the conversion of the response parameters from elasticities into derivatives.
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Figure 2.3: Impulse Responses in Recessions and Expansions
Notes: The thick solid lines with circles depict the responses by 
exible regime-switching pro-
jections in recessions, in expansions otherwise; all responses surrounded by one-standard error
bands. \cum(E)4" and \cum(R)4" refer to the p-values of the null for the accumulated responses
being equal to zero after two and four quarters; and \equal" is the p-value of a test for the
cumulative equality between the responses in the two regimes. Eects are expressed as dollar for
dollar and as change in basis points to a one-percent spending shock (tax and fed funds rate).
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Opposed to the regime-switching model of Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010), in
expansions, I again observe a trend toward spending reversals which carries over to the
responses of output and consumption. Although output increases on impact by 1.27 dollars
it then plummets below trend and starts recovering only after two years. Consumption
shows a similar behavior with an initial increase of about 0.35 dollars and an extended time
below trend afterwards. The response of consumption here looks a bit more like the one
from a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model in the real-business-cycle
or new-Keynesian fashion in which the negative wealth eect after a stimulus dominates:
expecting a larger tax burden in the future we tend to save more and consume less.
Likewise, more of us have access to the asset or credit markets and can smooth consumption
over time.
Recessions, then, constrain more and more people to participate in the asset or credit
market. They simply spend all their disposal income. Such \hand-to-mouth" consumers
naturally spend more in response to a rise in income through the stimulus. Although I
cannot draw on my own results, the higher income is likely to result from a shift in labor
demand and rms constrained in price-setting.12 Corsetti, Meier and M uller (2009) and
Gal , L opez-Salido and Vall es (2007) have scal DSGE models, though symmetric ones, in
which the positive demand eects from the hand-to-mouth consumers, among other model
features, outweigh the negative wealth eect.
During recessions the government keeps spending high. While output increases by
just 0.34 dollars on impact, the economic recovery picks up pace rather quickly and reaches
a peak at about four dollars one year out. With the common denition of the multiplier
as the peak response one would call the stimulus a great success. This conclusion can
be deluding. With no sign of a spending reversal it is better to bring the quadrupling of
output into perspective with the persistently high spending levels (see Woodford 2010).
The cumulative multiplier after one year is 1.26 dollars and is signicantly dierent from
one at the 7 percent level (see Table 2.2); after three years the eect is 1.99 dollars. Using
the same multiplier concept, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010) nd a recession eect
in a similar range: 2.24 dollars after four years.
12 See Bilbiie, Meier and M uller (2008) for evidence and a theoretical foundation in this
direction.
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With spending persistently above trend in recessions and a drop of the average per-
sonal income tax rate by about 25 basis points over the rst two quarters, federal debt
levels surge and reach a peak that is about three times as high as the initial one-dollar stim-
ulus. Then, after a year, the multiplier eect kicks in through the positive output eect,
the tax rate goes back to its previous level, and federal debts revert to trend. Spending
driven growth now does not have an adverse eect on future debt levels. Finally, the Fed
stands ready and helps to reinforcing the eects of a stimulus: the federal funds rate goes
down by about 50 basis points and stays at that level for six quarters.
2.4 Sensitivity Analysis
To check the sensitivity of the results under asymmetry, I substitute the proposed
method to compute recession weights from a business cycle index, band-pass ltering the
growth rate of output and a logistic transition function, with two dierent concepts.
One concept is to use a simple seven quarter centered moving-average lter as in
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010). The other one is a bit more involved and questions
the logistic transformation, equation (2.19), and the calibration of the smoothing param-
eter, 
. Instead of transforming the business cycle index into weights by a deterministic
logistic function, I treat the weights, or better say the change in regimes, as a random
variable. Specically, the index follows a mean switching model, zt = rt + "t, in which
the regime indicator, rt = fR;Eg, follows a two-state Markov chain with a probability of
p
RR to stay in a recession, 1   p
RR to recover and so forth. Pr(rt = Ejyt;yt 1 :::) and
one minus that value denote the probabilities of being in a recession or expansion; these
probabilities are then the respective weights in the 
exible regime-switching projections.
Details of estimating Markov-switching models can be found in Hamilton (1994).
Figure 2.4 plots the \band-pass weights" from Section 2.2.5 along with the two al-
ternative weighting methods. Centered moving-average ltering and its mechanistically
imposed seven quarter window has some troubles to mimic times when the economy dips
into two recessions within a few years, as happened in the early 1980s. The correlation
between the two methods is therefore with 0.60 relatively low. Markov-switching weights,
on the other hand, correlated highly with the band-pass weights (0.88) and show a sharp
distinction between recessionary and expansionary periods. The somewhat abrupt tran-
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Figure 2.4: Two Alternative Recession Weights
Notes: Two alternative ways to extract recession weights from the growth rate of output. The
top panel shows the recession weights coming from a seven quarter centered moving-average lter
and the logistic transition function (2.19) with a smoothing parameter 
 = 1:65. The bottom
panel presents the weights derived from a Markov-switching model in the mean of the (band-pass
ltered) business cycle index. Superimposed are the peaks and troughs of the NBER business
cycle dates.
sition across regimes matches the band-pass weights closely up until the mid-1970s but
cannot account for the Great Moderation and the subsample instability that goes along
with the dampened 
uctuations. Moreover, the Markov-switching model implies a prob-
ability that the economy was in a recession 35 percent of the time, compared to the 20
percent according to the NBER business cycle dates.
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show the impact of the dierent weighting methods on the impulse
responses. Compared to the band-pass benchmark, both alternatives to assign recession
weights yield qualitative similar responses. Quantitatively, I cannot reject the cumu-
lative equality between the responses of the band-pass/moving-average and the band-
pass/Markov-switching methods in 18 out of 21 instances: the moving-average method
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Figure 2.5: Impact of Dierent Weighting Methods on the Recession Responses
Notes: The thick solid lines show the responses when using the band-pass weights|the band-
pass ltered growth rate of output to compute the business cycle index and the logistic transition
function (2.19) with a smoothing parameter 
 = 1:65 to transform it into weights (see Figure
2.3). The broken lines with circles depict the responses with a seven quarters centered moving-
average instead of the band-pass lter; and in the underlying model of the broken-dotted lines
with triangles I replace the logistic transition function by a Markov-switching process in the
mean of the (band-pass) business cycle index. \equal1" and \equal2" are the p-values of the
test for the cumulative equality between the responses of the band-pass/moving-average and the
band-pass/Markov-switching methods. Eects are expressed as dollar for dollar and as change
in basis points to a one-percent spending shock (tax and fed funds rate).
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Figure 2.6: Impact of Dierent Weighting Methods on the Expansion Responses
Notes: The thick solid lines show the responses when using the band-pass weights|the band-
pass ltered growth rate of output to compute the business cycle index and the logistic transition
function (2.19) with a smoothing parameter 
 = 1:65 to transform it into weights (see Figure
2.3). The broken lines with circles depict the responses with a seven quarters centered moving-
average instead of the band-pass lter; and in the underlying model of the broken-dotted lines
with triangles I replace the logistic transition function by a Markov-switching process in the
mean of the (band-pass) business cycle index. \equal1" and \equal2" are the p-values of the
test for the cumulative equality between the responses of the band-pass/moving-average and the
band-pass/Markov-switching methods. Eects are expressed as dollar for dollar and as change
in basis points to a one-percent spending shock (tax and fed funds rate).
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predicts a modest debt increase with a fast reversal and no teamwork between scal and
monetary policy in recessions, and the expansion response of the average personal income
tax rate is more persistent. I read these results as evidence for the robustness to the details
of constructing the recession weights.
2.5 Conclusions
Geologists and astrophysicists thinking about continental drift and stellar evolution
all day long are a rare species among their profession. Economists spending day after day
answering questions about the eects or eectiveness of scal policy are not much of a
dierent kind. The Great Recession has now brought exactly these questions to the fore
and many economists, coming from other elds of specialization, attempt to shed light on
the issue with great enthusiasm. As always, then, many dierent approaches producing
dierent results are on the market and establishing a common denominator, something
most economists would agree on, seems to be a dicult and drawn-out process.
The major debate so far has been on the behavior of consumption after a spending
stimulus. I think this debate has come close to a resolution. We should by now gener-
ally accept the Keynesian view: consumption increases through the eect on aggregate
demand. Papers by Perotti (2007), Caldara and Kamps (2008), and Fisher and Peters
(2009), among others, make this point clear. I show further evidence in this direction, but
I also try to add some other points to the common denominator.
My results show the importance of two methodological innovations: approximating
smooth nonlinearities by means of 
exible projections and considering asymmetries over
the business cycle. The 
exible projections of Jord a (2005) are a series of VARs that
approximate a Taylor series expansion to the unknown DGP at each impulse response
horizon. A traditional VAR linearly approximates the DGP and iterates the coecients
forward in time to trace out the response paths; an inherently misspecication-prone
method. Impulse responses by 
exible projections are therefore a natural alternative.
These advantages become evident in the response of spending itself after a stimulus. Char-
acteristic is a reversal below trend (see Corsetti, Meier and M uller 2009). The government
wants to maintain the level of debts with respect to output but faces a political constraint
to increase taxes. Such a pattern toward spending reversals is exactly what I nd with the
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exible projections. Because of gradual changes over the post-WWII period, for instance
the Great Moderation or the steady vanishing of scal policy as a stabilization device,
traditional VAR approaches have diculties to detect this pattern.
The Great Moderation plays also a role in the other methodological innovation, though
only a supporting one. Here I am mainly concerned about the dierent eects of a stim-
ulus in recessionary and expansionary periods. To address the issue one would typically
split the sample according to the NBER business cycle dates with only a few observa-
tions in recessions. Estimates will, therefore, be unstable and imprecise. To have the
full sample at disposal, no matter which regime one wants to estimate, Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2010) propose to weighting each observation by a recession probability. I
cast their approach within the 
exible projections along with some renements for assign-
ing the weights. Besides the advantage of an increased sample size the reduced recession
probabilities from the mid-1980s onwards re
ect the Great Moderation. The weighting,
therefore, implicitly controls also for this nonlinearity in the DGP.
With the 
exible regime-switching projections I nd remarkable dierences between
the eects to a one-dollar stimulus in the two regimes. In recessions the government keeps
spending high throughout, output and consumption increase steadily. The government
spending multiplier is slightly above one dollar after one year and about two dollars after
three years. The average personal income tax does not change much and consequently the
level of debts surges. After a year the multiplier eect kicks in and the level of debts returns
to its pre-stimulus level. The Fed reinforces the eectiveness of the stimulus by letting the
federal funds rate decline. Finally, in expansions I still observe a spending reversal pattern
together with output and consumption responses which turn negative rather quickly. To
the extent the government typically tries to stimulate the economy in recessions, the
dierent sign of the consumption response does not contradict the Keynesian view. These
dierences pose a challenge on how to encompass the changing behavior of most of us in
recessions and expansions into a theoretical model. In the DSGE model of Corsetti, Meier
and M uller (2009), making the number of people who are constraint to live from hand to
mouth regime dependent, which it presumably is, may be a good starting point.
Besides the eectiveness of a stimulus in recessions and the sign of the consumption
response I can draw another conclusion. This last concluding remark sheds some light on
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the political debate of proper scal policy actions after the Great Recession. The debt
dynamics in recessions, together with a prolonged high level of spending and roughly un-
changed tax rates, support the view of the Obama administration, that without spending
driven growth now, future debt levels might be even higher. Some European governments,
notably Germany, take in principle the opposite view: there will be no growth without
budget discipline. The just mentioned nonlinear DSGE model with changing consumption
behavior can, perhaps, oer a deeper insight on this chicken-and-egg question. Altogether,
developing a nonlinear DSGE for assessing scal policy strikes me as a promising direction
for future research.
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Appendix 2.1 The Data in Detail
Below I describe and Figure A2.1 plots the U.S. data used in my analysis and the
respective sources. All series are on a quarterly basis and run from 1955:1 to 2009:4
(vintage June 8, 2010).
De
ator and population.|I take the output de
ator from NIPA table 1.1.4. (line 1)
and the civilian population over 16 from FRED (table CNP16OV). I convert the monthly
population gures into quarterly ones by taking the means of 3-month intervals. Through-
out, these two series will be used to transform current dollars into real per-capita dollars
Output components.|I use data from NIPA table 1.1.5. for output (line 1), and
nondurables and services consumption (lines 5 and 6); transformed into the logarithms of
real per-capita dollars.
Interest rate.|I use the geometric mean of the monthly federal funds rate (FRED,
table FEDFUNDS).
Fiscal variables.|Government spending consists of government consumption expendi-
tures and gross investment taken from NIPA table 1.1.5. (line 21); expressed in logarithms
of real per-capita dollars.
I dene the tax rate following Jones (2002) as the average personal income tax rate.
To construct the series I use NIPA tables 3.1. (line 3) and 1.12. (lines 3, 9, 12, 13, and 18)
and compute the ratio of personal current taxes to the sum of wage and salary accruals,
proprietors' income, rental income, corporate prots, and net interest. I multiply the
resulting series by 100 to express it in percent. Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004)
apply the same denition. Perotti (2007) and Ramey (2011) use a dierent concept:
the Barro-Sahasakul marginal income tax rate. The marginal rate has not been updated
beyond 2006 however (see Barro and Redlick 2009). An average rate is therefore appealing
because of its simple way to construct. In every case, the correlation of the two series of
tax rates is with about 0.85 relatively high and reassuring.
To construct the public debt series I combine yearly and quarterly observations on
gross federal debt held by the public from FRED (tables FYGFDPUB and FYGFDPUB).
The quarterly federal debt series is only available from 1970 onwards. I recursively backcast
the quarterly series until 1955 by using an autoregressive distributed lag model with one
lag of the federal debt variable itself and the current and lagged values of the in
ation rate,
Hauzenberger, Klemens (2011), On the Dynamic Effects of Government Stimulus: Measures in a Changing Economy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/27895CHAPTER 2 73
Figure A2.1: Quarterly U.S. Macroeconomic Time Series
Notes: I present the variables here as described above and as used in the econometric analysis:
the logarithms of real per-capita government spending, output, consumption, and public debt;
the average personal income tax rate; the federal funds rate; and Ramey's defense news variable.
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the federal funds rate, output, federal expenditures and federal receipts (NIPA table 3.2,
lines 1 and 20). I use the yearly observations to update the backcasts every four quarters.
The in
ation rate is the growth rate of the output de
ator and federal expenditures and
receipts are from NIPA table 3.2. (lines 1 and 20). This set of variables comprises the main
driving factors behind the evolution and accumulation of the federal debts (see Favero and
Giavazzi 2007). The series enters the analysis as the logarithm of real per-capita dollars.
Ramey's defense news variable.|Ramey (2009, 2011) measures the expected dis-
counted value of foreign political events and the related changes in government spend-
ing. In order to construct the series she gathers information from periodicals and ocial
sources with a particular focus on properly gauging the expectations of the public. The
series is expressed as the share of previous quarter output and multiplied by 100.
Business Cycle Index.|I extract the business cycle index from the real-per capita
output growth rate with a band-pass lter eliminating frequencies below six and above 32
quarters. The band-pass lter is the one of Baxter and King (1999) with a truncation point
of 200 quarters. To mitigate the endpoint problem inherent in this two-sided ltering con-
cept, I pad the output series by 200 quarters of back and forecasts using an autoregressive
model of order four. I standardize the index to have E(zt) = 0 and Var(zt) = 1.




A Time-Varying Structural VAR Model to
Estimate the Eects of Changes in Fiscal Policy
In this paper I study the dynamic macroeconomic eects of changes in
government spending or taxes by means of a time-varying parameter struc-
tural VAR. My results accord well with the notion of important changes
in the transmission of scal policy in the United States: the eectiveness
of scal policy in stabilizing the economy has decreased, more or less so
for tax shocks and de facto with respect to spending. I also nd evidence,
through counterfactual policy simulations, for positive long-run eects on
output when the government actively reduces the level of debts by cutting
spending. A passive debt reduction in the form of faster tax adjustments
in response to past expenditures has adverse eects on output. (JEL E62;
H30; H50; C32; C53)
Keywords: scal policy; transmission of shocks; policy counterfactuals;
time-varying parameter structural VAR; Markov chain Monte Carlo
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3.1 Introduction
What are the eects of changes in scal policy? The longest and the deepest recession
since the Great Depression that started in December 2007 and the various stimulus and
reinvestment measures enacted by the U.S. Congress to facilitate the recovery have ended
the eclipse of scal policy in the economic literature. Since then, many economists from
various elds of specialization have returned their interest to this classical question.
During my own research on the empirical eects of scal policy shocks over the last
years, I have encountered two main road blocks on the way, which make precise and un-
biased inference dicult: the identication of shocks, especially the tax shocks,1 and the
regime-dependent or changing transmission mechanism.2 These issues leave, of course,
plenty of room for new econometric approaches or just older ones used elsewhere in the
literature. To be clear where this paper is heading, the objective is to provide one possi-
ble solution for one of these road blocks: the changing transmission mechanism and the
resulting dierences in the eectiveness of scal policy. The particular application is to
the U.S. economy over the 1970:1-2010:3 period.
The proposed solution is the time-varying parameter structural vector autoregressive
model (TVP-VAR) of Primiceri (2005) in which all coecients, covariances and volatilities
vary over time. The laws of motion for the parameters allow for smooth and gradual
changes. As such, the method diers from the 
exible regime-switching model of Chapter
2 where the objective was to study the dierent eects of scal policy in recessions and
expansions rather than the evolution of its eectiveness. The estimation of the TVP-VAR
is in the Bayesian tradition of Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithms, Gibbs sampling in
particular, for the numerical evaluation of the posterior distributions of the parameters.
To identify government spending and tax shocks I follow Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
Their method is the most compelling and cited VAR-based approach to identifying scal
policy shocks and I will take it as given throughout this paper. Simply put, identication
1 See among others the seminal papers of Romer and Romer (2010) and Perotti (2011) for
measures of tax changes based on the narrative record of all major postwar tax policy acts; and
Leeper, Walker and Yang (2008) on the problems arising through scal foresight.
2 Papers in this direction are Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010), Kirchner, Cimadomo and
Hauptmeier (2010) and Pereira and Lopes (2010); Chapter 2 of this thesis deals with regime-
dependency and the dierences in the transmission mechanism of scal policy between recessions
and expansions.
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rests on the ability to disentangle, from the residual changes in government spending and
revenues, the discretionary part (i.e. the shocks) and the automatic adjustment to output.
The diculty, then, and methodological innovation of this paper is to cast this essen-
tially non-recursive identication strategy into the one of Primiceri (2005), a strategy that
relies on a triangular structure of the identifying matrix. The triangularity assumption
is convenient because it allows one to translate the TVP-VAR into a linear state space
model.
The paper further innovates in a second direction. Besides tracing out the eects of
the policy shocks, I estimate impulse response functions of changes in the parameters of the
government's decision rules on spending and taxes. Specically, I simulate a government
that tries to reduce the level of debts in two dierent ways: in an active one by cutting
spending and in a passive one by just adjusting taxes to cover past expenditures. I adopt
the design for the policy counterfactuals from the monetary policy literature, especially
from the work of Canova and Gambetti (2009). Their approach is particularly appealing
because it provides a way to take the estimated covariance structure among the coecients
into account, essentially the Lucas critique. Moreover, including the level of debts in
the model, controls for the constraints the debt path puts on future spending and tax
decisions, a channel typically ignored in the VAR-based scal policy analysis (see Favero
and Giavazzi 2007).
While there is a huge recent literature using TVP-VARs to evaluate monetary policy
(see, e.g., Primiceri 2005, Cogley and Sargent 2001, Canova and Gambetti 2009, Benati
and Surico 2008), applications for scal policy are scarce. Two notable exceptions are
Kirchner, Cimadomo and Hauptmeier (2010) and Pereira and Lopes (2010). The rst of
these two papers traces out the eects of government spending shocks in the euro area
and the second one identies both spending and tax shocks for the postwar U.S. economy.
Both papers conrm the notion of important changes in the transmission mechanism over
time: the eectiveness of scal policy in stabilizing the economy has decreased on both
sides of the Atlantic.
The rst set of my results is much in line with this general nding of Kirchner,
Cimadomo and Hauptmeier (2010) and Pereira and Lopes (2010). Changes in government
spending had a stronger positive eect on output, especially after six or seven quarters, in
Hauzenberger, Klemens (2011), On the Dynamic Effects of Government Stimulus: Measures in a Changing Economy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/27895CHAPTER 3 78
the 1970s and early 1980s. The picture is a bit dierent for the impulse responses to tax
shocks. Still, one can observe the same pattern between the 1970s and 2000s, but the late
1980s and early 1990s now seem to be the period when tax shocks were most eective.
Unlike the other periods, this mid-period was mainly characteristic for a few decit-driven
shocks (see Romer and Romer 2010), with a more persistent response of tax revenues and
the then desired eect of a signicant reduction of federal debts.
The results from the debt-reducing counterfactual policies suggest that the spending
cuts in the active government stance have hardly any adverse eects on the private sector
and output increases in the long-run. The anticipation of lower future spending rather than
higher taxes drives this result. Not surprisingly then, just levying taxes to achieve budget
surpluses without changing the spending behavior has detrimental eects on output.
3.2 Econometric Framework
Time-varying parameter structural VARs put quite a challenge on an econometrician
because of the sheer amount of parameters to estimate: 8,732(!) to be exact in the model
presented in this section. While it is still possible to write down the likelihood for the
estimation problem, it comes close to a mission impossible to maximize it over such a high
dimension, let alone the problem of multiple maxima in ranges where the parameter values
are anything but plausible. This classical maximum likelihood approach to estimation is
basically a special case of a Bayesian one with 
at priors. Bayesian estimation with
informative or diuse priors is therefore the natural choice to tackle the problem. Section
3.3 has the details.
Compared to the unproblematic and relative uncontroversial identication of mone-
tary policy, disentangling scal policy shocks is far from trivial. Because, strictly speaking,
there is no such thing as a \universal" scal shock that accounts for the numerous strings
policy makers can pull to counteract the business cycle by changing in spending and taxes.
A billion dollars spent for public infrastructure, education, or defense will hardly have the
same eects both on the individual citizen or the economy as a whole. In this paper I
am, however, pragmatic about this problem and keep the focus on the traditional macroe-
conomic issue of the aggregate economy. Focusing on the aggregate economy and, by
implication, on total government spending and tax revenue shocks is in line with seminal
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papers such as Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Mountford and Uhlig (2009).
Even though the traditional macroeconomic approach simplies matters considerably,
identifying scal policy shocks remains dicult because of endogeneities. Fiscal variables
and the business cycle are closely linked. For instance, both higher taxes and higher eco-
nomic growth, at an unchanged tax code, ll the Federal Treasury and, as a consequence,
we do not know whether the rise in tax revenues comes from a tax or business cycle shock.
To deal with the problem of endogeneity in identifying spending and tax shocks I
follow closely Blanchard and Perotti (2002). At the heart of their structural VAR method-
ology lies the identication of the just sketched automatic \feedback" of economic activity
on tax revenues and government spending. In order to pin down these feedback elas-
ticities, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) use additional information from outside the VAR
model about the tax and transfer system. Their method also rests on a timing assumption.
The quasi-impossibility of any discretionary within-quarter adjustment of scal policy in
response to economic shocks attributes any contemporaneous changes to the feedback
eects.
3.2.1 Data Description
The sample covers quarterly observations for the U.S. economy from 1970:1 until
2010:3. To keep my results, with respect to the denition of the scal data, comparable
with the seminal work of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and other studies in their tradition,
I dene these variables accordingly: spending includes both government consumption
expenditures and gross investment, and net taxes are the current receipts less net transfers
and net interest paid. The model further includes data on output and federal debts. As
Favero and Giavazzi (2007) forcefully argue and show, it is important to control for the
restrictions the debt path puts on future government spending and tax decisions. Ignoring
this channel would potentially introduce a bias.
All variables enter the analysis in the logarithmic form of their respective real per
capita values. The sources for nominal output, government spending, the necessary items
to construct net taxes, the de
ator, population and federal debts are the NIPA tables and
the FRED data base.3
3 Specically, NIPA tables 1.1.4 (line 1), 1.1.5 (lines 1 and 21), 3.1 (lines 1, 9, 11, 17 and 22),
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Figure 3.1: Spending, Net Tax and Debt Shares of Output
Figure 3.1 shows some of the high frequency properties of the data. While, in the
econometric analysis, I use the variables in the level-form described above, for a quick
visual inspection it is more appealing to look at, say, the shares of spending, net taxes
and federal debts with respect to output. Most importantly, the shares display patterns
that make the time-varying parameter model a natural choice. For instance, the spending
share declines steadily until the beginning of the new millennium but increase since then.
Likewise, the debt share remains either stable, increases, or decreases over periods of
several years. Besides these \long swings", which can be perfectly captured by TVP-
VARs, there are a couple of large quarterly changes in taxes and federal debts. The
rst episode is President Ford's large temporary tax rebate of 1975:2 and the second one
are the recent eects of the Great Recession. Depending on how much time variation one
allows for, a TVP-VAR could potentially capture such episodes of large and quick changes.
This catch-all strategy is, however, not warranted. Intuitively, the more time variation
one allows for in the VAR the more will be explained by the shocks as opposed to the
dynamics of the model.
3.2.2 Model Specication
The k-dimensional vector of quarterly observable variables, fytgT
t=1, includes the four
variables|real per capita output, government spending, net taxes and federal debts|
7.1 (line 18); and FRED data base (series FYGFPUN). All variables downloaded on February 21,
2011.
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in their logarithmic form. I assume yt = (yg;t; yt;t; yx;t; yd;t)
0 evolves according to the
TVP-VAR(p) process,
yt = Ct + B1;tyt 1 +  + Bp;tyt p + ut; (3.1)
in which Ct is a k1 vector of time-varying intercepts, Bi;t (i = 1;:::;p) are kk matrices
of time-varying coecients and ut are possibly heteroscedastic reduced-form residuals with
time-varying covariance matrix 
t. Iterating on (3.1) yields the innite moving average
representation, i.e.




t = Ik +
P1
h=1 h;tCt and h;t = J ~ Bh
t J0 in which ~ Bt is the corresponding VAR(1)












The parameters h;t for h = 1;:::;H represent the reduced-form impulse response
functions. To transform these responses into ones with a structural interpretation I use the
fairly simple model of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) that links the reduced-form residuals







1 0 0 0
0 1  
23;t 0
 31;t  32;t 1 0






























1 0 0 0
21;t 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
























in which (minus) 
23;t is the predetermined tax elasticity with respect to output. Following
Favero and Giavazzi (2007) and Perotti (2007) I use a value of 1.85 for this elasticity for
all t = 1;:::;T and, implicitly, a zero spending elasticity.4 Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
have the details on how to construct these elasticities based on institutional information
about the tax and transfer system.
4 The fact that government spending, dened as in Section 3.2.1, does not include transfer
payments justies the assumption of no feedback eect of spending to movements in the business
cycle. See also the evidence in Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
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The non-recursive structure of the Blanchard-Perotti model, however, imposes a twist
on the time-varying parameter framework of Primiceri (2005). In his model, identication
relies on a recursive Choleski-like decomposition and consequently on a lower triangular
matrix linking the reduced-form residuals with the structural shocks. Now, the specic
form of (3.4) allows me to recast the problem into a lower triangular matrix that contains








1 0 0 0
0 1  
23;t 0
0 0 1 0






























1 0 0 0
~ 21;t 1 0 0
~ 31;t ~ 32;t 1 0
























in which the mapping between (3.4) and (3.5) is
~ 21;t = 21;t;
~ 31;t = 31;t + 32;t21;t;
~ 32;t = 32;t; (3.6)
~ 41;t = 41;t + 42;t21;t + 43;t31;t + 43;t32;t21;t;
~ 42;t = 42;t + 43;t32;t; and
~ 43;t = 43;t:
We can write the structural model more compactly as
A
tut = ~ Att"t: (3.7)









1;t 0 0 0
0 2;t 0 0
0 0 3;t 0








5 This way to reparameterize (3.4) follows in principle the idea of Pereira and Lopes (2010).
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The structural impulse responses follow then from
h;t = h;tA 1
t ~ Att; h = 1;:::;H: (3.10)
For the estimation it will be practical to collect the slope coecients Bt = (B1;t :  :
Bp;t) in a k  kp matrix and to transform it together with the constants into a k(kp + 1)




t ~ Att"t; (3.11)
X0








in which the operator 
 denotes the Kronecker product. Like the constants and the
slope coecients, I bring the non-zero and non-one elements of the covariances ~ At and
volatilities t into vector form. Specically, ~ t = (~ 21;t; ~ 31;t; ~ 32;t  ; ~ k1;t; ;kk 1;t)0
and t = (1;t; ;k;t)0 where the corresponding row dimensions are k(k   1)=2 and k.
The vectors t, t, and t summarize all the time-varying parameters of the model.
As in Primiceri (2005) I let the coecients t and t evolve as random walks and the
volatilities t follow a geometric random walk:
~ t = ~ t 1 + t (3.12)
t = t 1 + t; (3.13)
logt = logt 1 + t: (3.14)
The specication for t falls into the class of models known as stochastic volatility. While
in innite samples a random walk hits any bound for sure, the use of nite samples makes
it possible to maintain the random walk assumption. A great advantage as we do not have
to estimate any further parameters, although, in principle, we could extend (3.12), (3.13),
and (3.14) to represent more general autoregressive processes (for details see Section 4.4.2
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in Primiceri 2005).
The innovations "t, t, t, and t are mutually uncorrelated Gaussian white noises
with zero mean and covariances Ik, Q, S, and W, known as the hyperparameters in the







































Ik 0 0 0
0 Q 0 0
0 0 S 0





























with all matrices, besides the k-dimensional identity matrix Ik, being positive denite.
The covariance of the innovation term in the state equation for the log volatilities is block
diagonal, i.e. S1 = Var([~ 21;t]), and Si 1 = Var([~ i1;t; ;~ ii 1;t]0) for all i =
3;:::;k. The rather specic assumptions on the structure of V and S are standard in the
literature (see, e.g., Primiceri 2005, Canova and Gambetti 2009, Benati and Surico 2008)
and are not essential to keep the estimation feasible. They oer, however, numerous
advantages: The rst one is the clear structural interpretation of the various sources of
uncertainty which would be cumbersome in the case of more non-zero blocks. Second,
the block-diagonality of S with blocks corresponding to parameters in separate equations
enables us to model the blocks [~ 21;t], [~ 31;t; ~ 32;t];:::; [~ k1;t; ; ~ kk 1;t] in linear state
space form. The advantage of linearity will become clear momentarily in Section 3.3.
And, nally, assuming mutually uncorrelated innovations does not exaggerated the curse-
of-dimensionality problem inherent in all time-varying parameter models any further.
3.2.3 Counterfactual Fiscal Policy Scenarios
What would have happened to output had the government pursued a more aggressive
policy to reduce to the level of debts? Questions like this appear to be simple with
time series models: just change the relevant parameters in the decision rules and trace
out the eects. But the eect of changing one parameter typically spreads over all the
other parameters, the essence of the Lucas critique. Canova and Gambetti (2009), in an
experiment that mimics a more aggressive monetary policy, provide a natural solution to
the critique by explicitly taking into account the covariance structure, i.e. the matrix Q
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in (3.15), of the whole coecient set.
Let us dene Gt = A 1
t ~ Att in (3.11) and rewrite the reduced-form model (3.1) in
structural form,
G 1
t yt = G 1
t Ct + G 1
t B1;tyt 1 +  + G 1
t Bp;tyt p + "t; (3.16)
or equivalently
G 1







t + "t = X0
t
t + "t; (3.17)
in which X0
t is dened as in (3.11) and 
t are the structural coecients. Using (3.13) and



























t, contains all the k(kp + 1) shocks. Let ~ !t  !t be the subvector
containing the n shocks of interest and the submatrix ~ Gt consists of the n corresponding
rows of G 1
t 
 Ikp+1 such that ~ !t = ~ Gtt. Given the last expression and the covariance
matrix Q from (3.13), we can write t conditional on ~ !t in turn as
t = Q ~ G0
t





Now to compute the impulse response function of the policy counterfactual I use the
method of Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996) and take the dierence between two distinct
realizations of the forecast Et(yt+ij). The two realizations are identical up to t   1, but
one realization assumes that there is a shock at date t of size ~ !t = , while the other




yt+hj~ !t = ;f~ !t+jgh












for h = 0;1;2;:::;H. Although  is only a one-time shock its eects are permanent
through the random walk nature of the law of motion for the time-varying parameters. To
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further ensure against the Lucas critique, I calibrate  to represent, in the sense of Leeper
and Zha (2003), only a modest or typical policy intervention relative to the sample. One
posterior standard deviation of the corresponding shock t to the reduced-form parameters
t (i.e. the square root of the associated diagonal element of Q) is consistent with such a
typical intervention.
My interest centers around two counterfactual scal policies that involve the structural
equations for government spending and taxes. Similar to Taylor rules, these structural
equations provide simple descriptions of scal policy-making, approximating the many
complex mechanisms and constraints that in
uence the government's decisions. Now, in
both counterfactual experiments, the objective is to bring the level of federal debts down.
The ways to get there dier, however. In the rst experiment, I simulate a government
that actively pursues its objective by cutting spending more aggressively with respect
to past debt levels. The other experiment shows what I call a passive government. It
achieves the debt reduction not by actively reacting to debt levels as before. Rather, the
government runs surpluses by adjusting taxes faster to cover recent expenditures.
For the technical implementation of the rst experiment|the active government
stance|I set up the matrix ~ Gt to contain the rows corresponding to the lagged coe-
cients of spending and debts in the spending equation. The specic shocks in the vector
 hit the debt coecients by minus one-standard deviation and leave the spending coef-
cients (i.e. the autoregressive component) unaltered. As the autoregressive component
has typically the highest weight in each VAR equation, any \indirect" eect induced by
changing other coecients may therefore dominate the dynamic eects of the counterfac-
tual experiment. Setting this indirect eect to zero ensures a clear interpretation of the
results with respect to the objective of the experiment (see Canova and Gambetti 2009).
Similarly, the second experiment|the passive stance|involves the lagged coecients on
spending and taxes in the tax equation; the shocks to the spending coecients are now
plus one-standard deviation and the ones aecting the autoregressive component are again
zero.
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3.3 Bayesian Estimation
Starting with the papers of Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Primiceri (2005), structural
time-varying parameter VARs with a recursive identication scheme have spread into
the macroeconometric literature, especially with applications to monetary policy. Their
method is appealing because it estimates the joint posterior of all parameters in the model,
a distribution from which it is dicult to sample directly, by splitting the problem into
smaller blocks. The parameters within each block can then be drawn from the conditional
distributions through Gibbs sampling.
The Gibbs sampler is a variant of a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm:
it exploits the principle that it is typically easier to sample from a lower dimensional
distribution, conditional on other parameters (i.e. the blocks). Gelman et al. (1995,
chap. 11) show that the stationary distribution of the Markov Chain generated by the
Gibbs sampler is the joint distribution we are looking for. Furthermore, MCMC algorithms
yield smoothed estimates of the time-varying parameters as they use information based
on the entire set of observations. Compared to particle lters, smoothing methods lead
to more ecient estimates when, like in this paper, the interest is in the evolution of the
observable states (see, e.g., Sims 2001, Primiceri 2005).
As a notational convention, a generic vector or matrix x consists of a sequence of
observable variables or estimates up to time , i.e. x = fxtg
t=1. I further express a
realization xt conditional on an information set, say, x as xtj and, likewise, I abbreviate
the conditional mean and variance of an arbitrary parameter  as tj and V 
tj. The
function p() denotes a generic density and dim() species the dimension of a vector.
3.3.1 Priors
An obvious choice to calibrate the priors are simple estimates from time-invariant
ordinary least squares regressions on (3.1) and (3.5). Such a strategy has already been
used by Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Primiceri (2005), among others. In its original form
this strategy requires to run these \auxiliary" regressions on a training sample that covers
data which are then discarded for the main analysis. As quarterly observations for federal
debts are only recorded after 1970 sacricing, say, ten years of data for a training sample
throws away a lot of information and might leave us with a too short sample. If a training
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sample is not available, Canova and Ciccarelli (2009) suggest to estimate the features of
the priors on the entire sample (see also Kirchner, Cimadomo and Hauptmeier 2010). As
a side eect, using a \full sample" prior, minimizes the uncertainty involved in choosing
proper priors. To denote the time-invariant estimator I will use \hats".
The details for the specication of the prior densities follow Canova and Gambetti
(2009) and are quite similar to the ones in Primiceri (2005) and other papers. For the initial
states of all time-varying parameters the priors p(0), p(~ 0) and p(log0) are normally
distributed, while the hyperparameters p(Q), p(Si) and p(W) have an inverse Wishart
distribution. Given the laws of motion (3.12), (3.13) and (3.14), this choice of prior dis-
tributions for the initial states and the hyperparameters leads to normal priors for the
entire sequences T, ~ T and logT. Like the normal distribution the Wishart distribution
requires two input arguments, the scale factor and the degrees of freedom. For the prior
to be proper the degrees of freedom must exceed the dimension of the respective hyper-
parameter at least by one; a choice of \just one" puts as little weight as possible on the
prior. As the inverse Wishart distribution is a conjugate prior for the covariance matrix
of the corresponding time-varying parameters t, ~ t and logt, the scale factor has to be
a multiple of the time-invariant covariance used to calibrate the prior for the initial states
and the degrees of freedom. Bringing everything together we have the following set of
prior densities for the parameters,
p(0) = N
 ^ ; Var(^ )

;
p(~ 0) = N










0:0003  (dim(^ ) + 1)  Var(^ )





0:001  (i + 1)  ^ Si
 1; i + 1

; i = 1;:::;k   1; (3.22)
p(W) = IW
 
0:001  (dim(^ ) + 1)  Ik
 1; dim(^ ) + 1

;
in which the variance ^ Si refers to the i-th block of S in (3.15) and the variance for log0
and W is arbitrarily chosen to be the identity matrix. The factors 0.0003 and 0.001 and
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the degrees of freedom in the prior specication correspond to the values in Canova and
Gambetti (2009). This choice transforms the initial informative priors Var(^ ) and ^ Si into
diuse and uninformative ones where more weight is on the sample information. This
practice is more or less standard in the TVP-VAR literature, although slight dierences
can be found for p(Q). Primiceri (2005), for instance, uses a factor of 0.0001 and 2dim()
for the degrees of freedom. The results for the two prior specications are, however, very
similar; see Cogley and Sargent (2005) for another paper that species the prior for p(Q)
as in (3.22).
3.3.2 Sampling Algorithm
The Gibbs sampling algorithm set forth here species three blocks of conditional dis-
tributions for all parameters in the model: the coecient states t; the covariance states
~ t; the volatility states t; and the hyperparameters Q, S and W. The rst two blocks
can easily be cast into a linear and Gaussian state space form and therefore the standard
algorithm for Gibbs sampling of Carter and RKohn (1994) can be used. Drawing volatility
states is a bit more tricky as they have a nonlinear and nonnormal state space form. Kim,
Shephard and Chib (1998) provide a linear and approximately Gaussian reformulation
of the problem with the advantage of restoring the assumptions needed for the standard
sampling algorithm to work. The approximation is necessary because the linear transfor-
mation leads to innovations in the observation equation that are distributed as log 2(1).
Following Kim, Shephard and Chib (1998), I approximate this log 2 distribution with a
mixture of seven normals. The indicator matrix sT denes, out of the seven components,
the selection of normal approximations for these innovations over t = 1;:::;T.




and algorithm in detail. | Equa-
tions (3.11) and (3.13), rewritten here for convenience,
yt = X0
tt + ut and t = t 1 + t; (3.23)
constitute a state space model in which both ut and t are normally distributed with a
zero mean and variances 
t and Q. Further, the block diagonal structure of (3.15) assumes
that ut and t are mutually uncorrelated. Now, conditional on the data, ~ T, T and V
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the covariance 
t in the observation equation is known from (3.9) and we can therefore
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0j0 = ^  and V








t 1jt 1 + Q; (3.25)






























leads to a draw of T form the normal distribution using the elements TjT and V

TjT from
the last recursion. We now plug the results of the lter and the draw of T into a reversed
version of the Kalman lter to derive T 1jT and V

T 1jT. This backward updating delivers
a draw for T 1 and so forth until we arrive at 1. Specially, the backward updating steps
for t = T   1;:::;1 are


























For more details on Gibbs sampling for state space models and the Kalman lter see Carter
and Kohn (1994) and Anderson and Moore (1979).
So far nothing ensures that draws of T result in stable VAR processes. In fact, the
use of data in level form with a more or less clear upward drift and possible nonstationarity
leads hardly to any stable draw because a stable VAR process is by denition stationary
(see Proposition 2.1 in L utkepohl 2005) As such, a strict \rule" as in Cogley and Sargent
(2001) that discards every sequence of draws T where at least one draw t has an unstable
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VAR representation is simply infeasible. For the analysis of monetary policy, stability is
a sensitive matter since the central bank's main objective is to maintain price stability.
The advantage in a monetary policy VAR, however, is that the variables typically enter in
rst dierences and the rule has therefore less bite and will not slow down the sampling
algorithm signicantly. In a scal policy VAR, on the other hand, the whole stability issue
may be less of a concern. As Kirchner, Cimadomo and Hauptmeier (2010) argue, certain
episodes may be well described by scal instabilities. In every case, I take a compromise
here and impose the stability rule on the growth rates of output, spending, taxes and
federal debts. Specically, I check the roots of the associated VECM polynomial of the
VAR and discard every draw that has more than k = 4 roots in or on the unit circle.




. | Starting with the compact form









t = ~ Atet: (3.27)
Conditional on T and the matrix of predetermined contemporaneous relations A
t, the
adjusted residuals y
t are observable. As in Primiceri (2005), here is the point where the
triangular form of the matrix ~ At with ones on the main diagonal can be conveniently used
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0 eg;t et;t 0 0 0

















































and (3.12) serves as state equation for ~ t. Now, the block-diagonality of the covariance
matrix S of the innovations t and block-triangular structure of the 46 matrix in (3.28),
enables us to use the algorithm of Carter and Kohn (1994), explained in Step 1, in an
equation-by-equation fashion. Specically, given T and the triangular form of ~ At, eg;t is
predetermined and thus ~ 21;t can be drawn in the rst equation. For the second equation
we use the draw of ~ 21;t and predetermine et;t such that we obtain draws for the block
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[~ 31;t; ~ 32;t]. Continuing this procedure of predetermining one structural shock at the
time leads to draws for the block [~ 41;t; ~ 42;t; ~ 43;t] in the third equation and so forth.
The triangular structure of predetermined variables in the system of equations and the
independence across the blocks of S restores the necessary assumption of a linear state
space model in the Carter and Kohn (1994) algorithm.
Table 3.1: Selection of the Mixing Distribution to be log2(1)
j pj mj v2
j j pj mj v2
j
1 0:00730  10:12999 5:79596 5 0:34001 0:61942 0:64009
2 0:10556  3:97281 2:61369 6 0:24566 1:79518 0:34023
3 0:00002  8:56685 5:17950 7 0:25750  1:08819 1:26261
4 0:04395 2:77786 0:16735
Notes: Replication of Table 4 in Kim, Shephard and Chib (1998).




. | Drawing T relies on the algo-
rithm of Kim, Shephard and Chib (1998), a procedure to transform an otherwise nonlinear
and nonnormal state space model into a linear and approximately normal one; conse-
quently, the standard algorithm of Carter and Kohn (1994), as laid out in Step 1, is again










Given yT;T; ~ T the right-hand side is observable and is nothing else than the set of
identied structural shocks, et, of Step 2. Since I have dened the law of motion (3.14)
for the diagonal entries of t as a geometric random walk, we can convert (3.29) into the
appropriate form by squaring and taking the logarithm. We obtain the linear state space
model
e












for i = (g;t;x;d); the oset constant
0.001 deals with very small values of e2
i;t as in Kim, Shephard and Chib (1998); and the
innovation t follows a log2(1) distribution. While this conversion restores the linearity
assumption, the distributional form of t still precludes direct and simple inference. Kim,
Shephard and Chib (1998) show how to accurately approximate the log 2(1) distribution
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i;tjmj   1:2704; v2
j







denotes the density function of a normal distribution with
mean mj  1:2704 and variance v2
j. Values for pj, mj and v2
j are reproduced in Table 3.1.






in Step 1 to draw logi;t for all i and t. Given these draws of i;t we independently sample
each si;t from the discrete density Pr(si;t = jje
t;logi;t), a density which is proportionally
determined from the normal density N
 
e




Step 4: Hyperparameters. | The inverse Wishart is a convenient choice for the prior
distribution of the innovation variances V in (3.15), i.e. the hyperparameters Q, W
and the blocks of S. Since the parameters T, ~ T and T are mutually uncorrelated
draws from a normal distribution the posterior distribution of each hyperparameter is also
inverse Wishart. Conditional on T, ~ T, T, sT and yT the innovations in (3.15) become
observable and it is therefore relatively easy to draw the hyperparameters from the inverse
Wishart. The scale matrix and the degrees of freedom, the two factors that fully specify
the inverse Wishart, are based on the choice for the prior distribution and take the form







and dim(^ ) + 1 + T;

0:001  (i + 1) + T  ^ Si
 1
and i + 1 + T; i = 1:::;k   1; (3.32)







and dim(^ ) + 1 + T;
in which ^ Si denotes the variance of the i-th block of S in (3.15).
For the counterfactual analysis, Step 1 needs to be slightly modied. Everything
else being as just laid out, the shocked and shock-free realizations of the impulse response
function (3.20) come from draws of t 1. The sequence of parameters t+h, h = 0;1;:::;H,
follows then from (3.13) and (3.19) either with ~ !t =  or ~ !t = 0.
The Gibbs sampling algorithm is now complete. Iterations on Steps 1 to 4 produce a
set of draws from the conditional distributions that converge in the limit to the joint pos-
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terior distribution of all the parameters in the model (see, e.g., Gelfand and Smith 1990).
I perform 100;000 iterations from which I discard the rst 50;000 and save only every fth
draw of the remaining 50;000 draws. This \thinning" practice breaks the autocorrelation
of the draws since draws from a Markov chain are typically not independent.
3.3.3 Convergence Diagnostics of the Markov Chain
From theoretical work such as Gelfand and Smith (1990) we know that the Gibbs
sampler converges to the \true" joint posterior distribution as the number of iterations
goes to innity. Whether this property holds in an empirical application with a nite
number is an important question which I address here. Intuitively, convergence of the
Markov chain slows down the more complicated the conditional distribution gets.
I implement three MCMC convergence diagnostics for the 10;000 saved draws of
each parameter and hyperparameter: the sample autocorrelation; the measure of Geweke
(1992); and the Raftery and Lewis (1992) diagnostic. Table 3.2 reports the results of the
diagnostic checks for each of the 8;732 parameters in the model. Because of the sheer
amount of parameters the table shows summary statistics, grouped into hyperparameters
V , coecients T, covariances ~ T and volatilities T. Moreover, each summary statistic
reports two values based on the rst and last 1;500 draws from the 10;000 saved iterations.
This testing strategy adds another layer to the formal MCMC diagnostics: if the Markov
chain is in an equilibrium state the means of these two splits should be roughly equal.
The 20-th-order sample autocorrelations summarized in Panel A of Table 3.2 show
a relatively low degree of autocorrelation. Only a few hyperparameters V exhibit statis-
tics higher than 0.2. The draws are therefore almost independent, an indication for the
eciency of the algorithm and for accurate posterior estimates. Related to that is the
ineciency factor, as measured by the inverse of the relative numerical eciency statistic
of Geweke (1992) with a 4% tapered window for the estimation of the spectral density
at frequency zero. If the draws come from an independent and identically distributed
(iid) sample, drawn directly form the posterior distribution, the ineciency factor has a
value of one. For instance, in Panel B of Table 3.2 the mean value of 10.94 for the last
1;500 draws of the hyperparameters V indicate that about eleven times as many draws
are necessary to achieve the same numerical eciency of an iid set of draws. Since only
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values above 20 are considered to be critical and 10.94 is the largest one here, Table 3.2
conrms the iid nature of the draws. Finally, Raftery and Lewis (1992) provide a measure
of the number of draws actually required to achieve a certain accuracy of the posterior
summaries of the Markov chain. I set the parameters for this test such that a nominal
reporting based on a 95% interval using the 0.025 and 0.975 quantile points leads to an
accuracy of the posterior values of 0.025 to the left and right of the specied quantiles in
the cumulative distribution function. The probability of attaining this accuracy is 95%.
The maximum number over the whole parameter space for the Raftery and Lewis (1992)
diagnostic is 4;818 and thus well below the 10;000 draws used in the analysis. All three
MCMC convergence diagnostics do not indicate any problems with the Gibbs sampler.
Table 3.2: Convergence Diagnostics of the Markov Chain
Median Mean Min Max 10-th 90-th
A. 20-th-Order Sample Autocorrelations
V  0:02 0:04  0:02 0:04  0:31  0:05 0:44 0:49  0:15  0:01 0:13 0:08
T 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00  0:20  0:03 0:18 0:05  0:07  0:01 0:07 0:02
~ T  0:04 0:01  0:03 0:01  0:14  0:02 0:10 0:03  0:11  0:01 0:07 0:02
T  0:02 0:00  0:02 0:01  0:17  0:03 0:11 0:09  0:07  0:01 0:05 0:02
B. Ineciency Factor
V 5:74 10:67 5:74 10:94 3:79 4:16 9:54 41:34 4:54 7:36 6:86 14:50
T 1:11 1:43 1:15 1:50 0:50 0:61 2:49 4:35 0:86 1:04 1:50 2:02
~ T 0:94 1:08 0:96 1:30 0:70 0:77 1:36 2:69 0:85 0:83 1:13 2:21
T 1:31 1:66 1:38 1:87 0:74 0:78 3:57 10:28 0:98 1:10 1:87 2:64
Notes: Summary of the distributions of the 20-th-order sample autocorrelations and the inef-
ciency factors (the inverse of Geweke's (1992) measure of relative numerical eciency with a
4% tapering of the spectral window at frequency zero) for the whole parameter space. \10-th"
and \90-th' denote the 10-th and 90-th percentiles. Each statistic has two entries which refer to
statistics based on the rst and last 1;500 draws out of the saved 10;000. The discarded burn-in
draws are 50;000 and the thinning factor is ve.
3.4 Results
I center the discussion of the results, especially the observed changes over the last
40 years, around three topics: the volatility of government spending and tax shocks, the
propagation of these shocks and counterfactual scal policy scenarios.
Hauzenberger, Klemens (2011), On the Dynamic Effects of Government Stimulus: Measures in a Changing Economy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/27895CHAPTER 3 96
3.4.1 Volatility of the Fiscal Shocks
Figure 3.2 shows the time prole of the median and the interval containing 68% of
the posterior distribution of the standard deviation of the estimated scal policy shocks.
For the government spending shock the median and the 68% interval are fairly stable over
time while for tax shocks these statistics are, on average, lower in the 1980s and 1990s
than at the beginning and the end of the sample. The picture of a relatively high volatility
in the 1970s, with a peak around 1975, and in the 2000s is consistent with Romer and
Romer's (2010) narrative analysis of tax shocks. The 1970s and early 1980s were periods
of frequent and large tax changes, such as Presidents Ford and Reagan's tax cuts, mainly
aimed to boost long-run growth or to counteract economic conditions. Until the Bush tax
cuts of the early 2000s and the tax measures included in the 2008-2009 stimulus packages
there were only a few and relatively modest decit-driven tax changes.
Figure 3.2: Standard Deviation of the Structural Shocks
Notes: The two graphs displays the time-varying volatility parameters 1;t and 2;t in (3.8).
Superimposed are NBER-dated U.S. recession episodes.
3.4.2 The Dynamic Responses to Fiscal Shocks
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 display the systematic responses to scal shocks. I focus on three
specic periods: 1975:2, 1991:2 and 2009:1. Although all of them represent NBER-dated
troughs of U.S. recessions the sole objective is to uncover changes in the transmission of
scal policy shocks over the last 40 years. Since I use smoothed estimates based on the
entire set of observations the responses in, say, 1973:4 and 1975:2 are hard to distinguish
from each other. Overall, the impulse responses support, perhaps with a few exceptions,
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the common belief about the changing transmission mechanism of scal policy. Solow
(2005) brings this change to the point: \[t]he use of scal policy as a stabilization device
has all but vanished [...] in the United States."
The output response to a spending shock (Figure 3.3) was more eective in (and
around) 1975:2 when there was considerable slack in the U.S. economy; the general U-
shaped pattern is in line with the results of Blanchard and Perotti (2002). While the
spending response is relatively persistent and similar over time, tax revenues fall below
zero after an initial increase and slowly revert to trend. This U-shape is mainly driven
by the automatic adjustment of tax collections to changes in output but the pattern is
somewhat dierent over time, re
ecting changes in the Taylor-type rule describing tax-
policy making (i.e. the structural tax equation). Around 1975:2, a discretionary increase
in spending leads to a faster decline of future tax revenues. This faster decline comes,
however, at the cost of higher future debts.
Figure 3.3: Responses to Spending Shocks
Notes: Impulse responses of output, government spending, net taxes and federal debts to spend-
ing shocks in 1975:1, 1991:1 and 2009:2. Responses expressed in percentage changes.
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In Figure 3.4, the output eects to tax shocks are, perhaps, the exception to the
mentioned conventional wisdom of a declining scal policy eectiveness. A tax shock
leads to a higher (negative) output response in 1991:1 than in 1975:1. The years around
1991 were a period of several decit-driven tax changes aimed to bring the ever rising debt-
to-output ratio to a halt (see right panel in Figure 3.1). More persistent tax revenues and
lower spending, although the spending eect is in general quite small, reduce debt levels
more eectively than in other periods. This debt reduction motive of the government has,
of course, detrimental eects on output.
Figure 3.4: Responses to Tax Shocks
Notes: Impulse responses of output, government spending, net taxes and federal debts to tax
shocks in 1975:1, 1991:1 and 2009:2. Responses expressed in percentage changes.
Much of the debate about scal policy eectiveness centers around the size of spend-
ing and tax multipliers. Figure 3.5 displays the response of output in dollars to a one
dollar input shock at selected horizons from 1970:3 until 2010:3. To convert the original
elasticity estimates from before into dollar-for-dollar changes, I divide the elasticities by
the spending-to- and tax-to-output ratio prevailing at time t. These are the ratios plot-
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ted in the left panel of Figure 3.1. For better comparison of the two multiplier eects, I
compute the tax multipliers based on negative shocks.
Three results stand out from the multiplier analysis. First, the spending multiplier in
the 1970s is, on average, more eective in the long-run: with one dollar, the government
buys about 1.60 dollars of output four years out. Second, the impact spending multiplier
increases almost steadily over time, from one dollar in 1970 to 1.25 dollars in 1998. This
eect arises, however, mostly through the declining spending share (see Figure 3.1). In
every case, the size of the spending multipliers is reasonable throughout, taking values
between 0.50 and 1.60 dollars before 1980 and between 0.50 and 1.25 dollars after 1980.
Table 2 in Hall (2009) provides a summary of several time-invariant VAR estimates: there
the multipliers range from 0.50 up to 1.20 dollars. Finally, tax multipliers lie consistently
below the spending multipliers. Starting with a value of 0.50 dollars in 1970 the eect after
four years reaches its peak at roughly 0.80 dollars in 1983 and decreases thereafter until it
reaches again the 0.50 dollar mark in 2010. For the other horizons the eects lie between
zero and 0.40 dollars with no obvious drifts. The comparison of tax multipliers with other
papers is 
awed because recent papers such as Romer and Romer (2010) and Perotti
(2011) use a narrative approach to identify tax shocks and get much larger eects. For
that reason, I plan to incorporate narrative measures of tax shocks in a scal TVP-VAR
in future work.
Figure 3.5: Multipliers
Notes: The spending and tax multipliers display the output responses expressed as dollar-for-
dollar changes. Conversion from percentage changes into dollar changes based on the spending-to-
and tax-to-output ratio prevailing at time t (see ratios in Figure 3.1). For better comparison
with the spending multipliers, I use a negative tax shock to compute the tax multipliers.
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3.4.3 Fiscal Policy Counterfactuals
The objective of the counterfactual experiments laid out in Section 3.2.3 is to simulate
a government that reduces the level of debts in two dierent ways, an active and passive
one. In the rst experiment I let the government cut spending more aggressively whenever
we observe rising debts and, in the second one, the government adjusts taxes more swiftly in
response to higher expenditures. Scenario one requires the government to directly control
the level of debts through tighter spending constraints and has a stronger incentive to
increase its own eciency. Under scenario two, on the other hand, the government just
levies enough taxes in order to pay for whatever expenditures they made in the previous
periods. The questions is then how the dierent objectives and incentives the government
has in the active and passive stance will spread over the private sector and how, as a
result, it will aect output.
The design of the counterfactual follows Canova and Gambetti (2009) and circumvents
the Lucas critique by accounting for the eect a change in one or more coecients has
on the whole coecient structure t through the estimated correlation Q. I display the
counterfactual responses in Figures 3.6 and 3.7 at four specic dates: the three recession
trough dates used above|1975:1, 1991:1, 2009:2|and in addition 1984:1. The impulse
response function in (3.20) implies a dependency on the local history of the variables. I
add this specic date because it represents a time when all four variables were growing
rapidly; it therefore provides a natural counterpart to the three trough dates.
The responses in Figures 3.6 and 3.7 conrm the hunch that the two government
stances imply dierent eects on output. In the active stance the spending cuts have no
adverse output eects in the long-run: it positively aects the private sector and outweighs
the stresses and strains from the debt reduction. When the government is in the passive
stance, output decreases: even though spending increases the government raises taxes
swiftly and puts any positive incentives for the private sector on hold. Corsetti et al.
(2010) have a standard New Keynesian model that delivers the same qualitative eects.
In their model, government spending either responds to the deviation of debts from a
target level or is entirely nanced by taxes, similar to my active versus passive scenarios.
Key to the positive output eect is the private sector's anticipation of prospective spending
cuts (i.e. the incentive) rather than higher taxes.
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Figure 3.6: Active Government Stance
Notes: Counterfactual responses of output, government spending, net taxes and federal debts in
1975:1, 1984:1, 1991:1 and 2009:2. The experiment simulates a government that reduces debts by
means of more aggressive spending cuts. Computed along the lines of Section 3.2.3 and Canova
and Gambetti (2009). Responses expressed in percentage changes.
The counterfactual responses in the recent 2009:2 period dier somewhat from other
periods. In Figure 3.6 the government reduces spending and, at same time, increases
taxes by more than in 1975:1, 1984:1 and 1991:1. This result is emblematic for the severe
recession in 2008 and 2009 with extreme changes in all four variables which, in turn,
require larger counterfactual responses of the public sector variables in order to achieve a
certain goal. Only output lags behind: the counterfactual output response lies below the
others at horizons beyond ten quarters. Also in the passive stance in Figure 3.7 one sees
a much smaller negative output response in the 2009:2 period. The spending increase is
accompanied by a less pronounced rise in taxes and a smaller reduction of debts, thus the
subdued eects on output.
The general message here is clear. A government that actively reduces debts by
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Figure 3.7: Passive Government Stance
Notes: Counterfactual responses of output, government spending, net taxes and federal debts in
1975:1, 1984:1, 1991:1 and 2009:2. The experiment simulates a government that reduces debts
by adjusting taxes more quickly in response to higher expenditures. Computed along the lines
of Section 3.2.3 and Canova and Gambetti (2009). Responses expressed in percentage changes.
cutting spending in a credible way provides enough incentives for the private sector to
pitch in for the government in the long-run. Passively reducing debts by just controlling
the decit through tax adjustments does not seem to be good policy-making.
3.5 Conclusions
In this paper, I contribute to the huge recent literature on the eects of scal policy
by highlighting the time-variation in the transmission of government spending and tax
shocks. My analysis is cast in the time-varying parameter structural VAR framework
of Primiceri (2005) which, with a few exceptions, has been mainly used so far to study
monetary policy. Specically, I model scal policy and the private sector behavior of the
U.S. economy over the last four decades, including data on output, government spending,
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net taxes and federal debts. Estimation relies on an ecient Markov chain Monte Carlo
algorithm, Gibbs sampling in particular, for the numerical evaluation of the posterior
distributions.
The main results accord well with the conventional wisdom of a declining eectiveness
of changes in scal policy, with one qualication for taxes. Unlike other periods, the late
1980s and early 1990s were characteristic for decit-driven tax changes with the objective
to reverse the course of the surging debt-to-output ratio. The TVP-VAR uncovers this mid-
period as the one when tax policy was most eective, especially with respect to reducing
the level of debts. Overall, the observed pattern of time-variation, makes a TVP-VAR an
attractive and natural choice for the empirical characterization of changes in scal policy.
From a methodological point of view the paper innovates upon the TVP-VAR lit-
erature in one important aspect. It implements the widely used Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) method to identifying scal policy shocks into a TVP-VAR. The twist is, simply
put, that identication requires a non-recursive structure of the contemporaneous impact
matrix, whereas Primiceri's (2005) framework relies on a triangular shape of that matrix.
While Pereira and Lopes (2010) are the rst who provide a solution to this aspect, my re-
formulation of the problem is more compatible with the estimation algorithm of Primiceri
(2005). Whether the method of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) is the best way to identi-
fying the \true" underlying government spending and tax shocks was beyond the scope
of this paper. In every case, their is plenty of room for more ingenuity. An immediate
extension would be to identify the shocks through sign restrictions as in Mountford and
Uhlig (2009), although eliciting better information on impulse responses is by no means
guaranteed as the identifying restrictions provide very weak information. On the other
hand, combing the new narrative-based tax measures, most notably Romer and Romer
(2010), with TVP-VARs is, perhaps, a more promising direction of research for dealing
with identication issues. Especially the ones arising through scal foresight.
In addition to the methodological contribution, I use the counterfactual policy design
of Canova and Gambetti (2009) to study the eects of two dierent ways to reduce the
level of debts: actively by cutting spending and passively through budget surpluses ob-
tained from tax adjustments in response to past expenditure levels. In that respect, the
counterfactual analysis also bears on the policy debate about what should follow after the
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recent, mostly decit-nanced, stimulus packages. As one may perhaps expect, the active
government policy stance has hardly any adverse eects on output. In fact, output tends
to increase in the long-run. The passive stance, on the other hand, provides no positive
spillover eects on the private sector and, consequently, output decreases. The dierences
arise through the way the government actions aect private incentives and the anticipation
of tax changes. A government that reduces the debt burden in a credible and active way
and, in the same time, may increase its own eciency provides enough positive incentives
for the private sector to more than compensate for the reduced public expenditures.
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